ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE by LI YUNONG
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LI YUNONG
(B.S. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)
A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2016
Declaration
I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been
written by me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of
information which have been used in the thesis.
This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university
previously.
Signed:
Date: May 12, 2016
i
Acknowledgements
The generous support of professors, friends, classmates and my family not
only made this thesis possible but also my life as a PhD candidate less
diﬃcult. I am indebted to all people that have helped me on this journey.
Firstly, it is with my greatest gratitude that I acknowledge the support
and guidance from my supervisor, Professor Lu Yi. His knowledge and
enthusiasm for research have helped me a lot writing this thesis and de-
veloping my research capability. He has been more than considerate when
supervising me and his support extends beyond research. In fact, I was
inspired by Professor Lu Yi to become a researcher. He has organized In-
ternational Trade and Labor Reading Group and I have beneﬁted a lot from
it by practicing presentation and learning some recent and well-published
academic papers.
I am also grateful for my co-author, Professor Chen Xiaoping and Pro-
fessor Hsu Wen-tai. They have generously shared their knowledge and
experience with me and have been very kind and patient throughout our
collaboration.
I would like to thank Professor Davin Chor and Professor Ma Lin who
have provided many valuable comments and suggestions for this thesis and
my overall research on international trade. Professor Davin Chor is in
my thesis committee and he has organized International Economics and
Economic Development Reading Group which helped me and many other
ii
PhD students in our department. Professor Ma Lin has helped me a lot
since he joins NUS and he is always approachable and friendly.
I would like to thank Dr. Liu Zhengning and Dr. Zylkin. They also
have given many comments and suggestions to my research.
I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee, Professor Liu
Haoming and Professor Zeng Jinli. They are encouraging and helpful.
I would like to thank all of my PhD classmates. There are so many
good memories and their support means a lot to me. It's my honor to
study together with them for the past 4 years and I give my best wishes to
my classmates.
I would like to express my great appreciation to all the participants in
the 2013 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, the China Economists'
Society (CES) 2015 Annual Conference, 2015 International Conference on
Transnational Corporations and China's economy: challenges and oppor-
tunities, and reading groups in NUS. Their comments are valuable for this
thesis.
Last but not the least, this thesis is dedicated to my family. I owe my
deepest gratitude to my family for their love and support.
iii
Contents
1 Trade Liberalizationand Industrial Agglomeration: Evidence
From China 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Measures of Industrial Agglomeration . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 China's Accession to WTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Theoretical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 Firm Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.3 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.1 Speciﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.2 Identiﬁcation Assumption and Checks . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5 Empirical Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.1 Baseline Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.2 Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
iv
1.5.3 Additional Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.7 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 Revisiting Linder Hypothesis with International Produc-
tion Fragmentation 39
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2.1 Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.2 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2.3 Trade ﬂows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3.1 Value-added trade ﬂow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3.2 Gravity and income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.1 Value-added trade ﬂow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.2 VAX ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.6 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3 China's WTO Accession, International Production Frag-
mentation, Trade and Welfare Eﬀects 69
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
v
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3 China's signiﬁcant and increasing participation in interna-
tional production fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.4.1 Intermediate goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4.2 Composite intermediate goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4.3 Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4.4 International trade costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4.5 Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4.6 Expenditure and trade balance . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.5 Quantifying Trade and Welfare Eﬀects from China's WTO
Accession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5.1 Domestic Trade and Welfare Eﬀects from China's
WTO Accession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.5.2 Global Trade and Welfare Eﬀects from China's WTO
Accession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.7 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Bibliography 116
Appendices 128
A Equilibrium in relative changes 128
vi
B Welfare and real wage decomposition 130
vii
Summary
My thesis is titled Essays on International Trade and consists of three
chapters. It is empirical study of trade in nature and specialized in trade
policy and international production fragmentation.
A trade policy is a set of rules and regulations that are intended to
change international trade ﬂows, particularly to restrict imports. It is a
traditional and important topic of international trade. At the hands of
trade economists, episodes of trade liberalization have been used to eval-
uate the various economic and social eﬀects of international trade. While
the trade barriers have been reduced signiﬁcantly in the past decades, the
research on trade policy remains open. Existing research on trade policy
is primarily about tariﬀ barrier while non-tariﬀ barrier receives much less
attention due to the limitation of data and methodology. In the globalized
world today in which not only goods but also labour and knowledge are
mobile across borders trade policy is relevant to aspects other than the
international trade ﬂows.
International production fragmentation involves the production process
stretched across multiple countries. It has also been labeled extensively:
vertical specialization, outsourcing, global value chain and etc. The
nature and the way of international trade changed as international produc-
tion fragmentation becomes prominent in recent decades. While it receives
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much research attention recently the organization and the consequences of
international production fragmentation remain largely unanswered. The
theories of international production fragmentation remain elementary and
the empirical evidences are stylized.
The ﬁrst chapter titled Trade Liberalization and Industrial Agglomera-
tion: Evidence from China investigates whether trade liberalization aﬀects
industrial agglomeration. China's accession to WTO by the end of 2001
provides a window of opportunity for diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DID) iden-
tiﬁcation. Our ﬁnding passes a battery of robustness checks and suggests
that trade liberalization increases geographical concentration of industries.
The second chapter titled Revisit Linder Hypothesis under Interna-
tional Production Fragmentation relates Linder Hypothesis, an old the-
ory with international production fragmentation, a new development.
Linder Hypothesis predicts more trade ﬂows between countries with sim-
ilar income. As a prominent alternative to the Ricardian and Heckscher-
Ohlin models it receives at best mixed empirical evidence. In this chapter
we develop a model which illustrates why in the presence of international
production fragmentation Linder Hypothesis may disappear in gross trade
ﬂows and be recovered in value-added trade ﬂows. We oﬀer some empirical
support to the main idea of this chapter.
The third chapter titled China's WTO Accession, International Pro-
duction Fragmentation, Trade and Welfare Eﬀects, to some extent, con-
ix
tinues and bridges the work of my ﬁrst two chapters. I document China's
signiﬁcant and increasing role in international production fragmentation
at aggregate and industry level. A multi-country multi-sector Ricardian
model with comprehensive input-output structure is used to quantify the
trade and welfare eﬀects of the WTO accession. China's welfare increases
by 1% while trade grows by 42.9% from the WTO accession. There is trade
diversion to China and the global welfare eﬀect is small.
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Marshall (1920) suggests that industrial clusters arise because of knowl-
edge spillovers, the advantages of a market for specialized skills, and the
backward and forward linkages associated with large local markets. Such
channels remain important in recent literature. (Duranton and Puga, 2004;
Brülhart, 2010) The new economic geography literature has focused on
modeling the last of the three forces extensively, and also the eﬀect of
trade liberalization on these linkages, and as a result of it, on industrial
agglomeration. (Fujita et al., 1999) The eﬀect of trade liberalization on
industrial agglomeration is not straightforward. Krugman and Elizondo
(1996) suggest that in the presence of congestion cost protectionist policies
are responsible for large cities in developing countries and that trade liber-
alization generally weakens these forward and backward linkages and leads
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to a more even distribution of economic activities. Paluzie (2001) replaces
congestion cost in Krugman and Elizondo (1996) with an immobile agri-
culture sector as the centrifugal force and trade liberalization in this case
leads to agglomeration of the manufacturing industry.
While theoretical models can deliver diﬀerent predictions for the eﬀect
of trade liberalization on industrial agglomeration the empirical evidence
from diﬀerent episodes of trade liberalization is mixed as well. Hanson
(1998a,b) studies whether North American economic integration leads to
regional adjustment of economic activity inside countries and ﬁnds that in-
dustries in Mexico relocate from Mexico city to US-Mexico border after the
establishment of NAFTA. Sjöberg and Sjöholm (2009) on the other hand
examine the spatial concentration of manufacturing industries in Indone-
sia between 1980 and 1996, a period of rapid trade liberalization, and ﬁnd
that the high concentration of manufacturing industries does not decrease
during this period.
Our paper studies the eﬀect of trade liberalization on industrial agglom-
eration in the Chinese context. Our analysis uses China's WTO accession
by the end of 2001 as a natural experiment for identiﬁcation. Our identi-
ﬁcation is a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DID) estimation, that is, we compare
the industrial agglomeration of industries experiencing more tariﬀ reduc-
tion upon WTO accession (the treatment group) with that of industries
experiencing less tariﬀ reduction (the control group) before and after 2001.
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Our ﬁnding is that industries experiencing more tariﬀ reduction become
more clustered. The mechanism similar to Paluzie (2001) is our proposed
explanation for our empirical ﬁndings. In short, trade liberalization at
industry level induces more foreign competition. Local demand of the im-
mobile sector for domestic manufacturing output is reduced and cannot
attract manufacturing industries to locate locally. The centripetal forces,
backward and forward linkages, start to dominate and the manufacturing
industries then tend to become more concentrated. The extent of industrial
agglomeration in China is much less than that in developed countries prior
to its trade liberalization.1 This cannot be explained by Krugman and
Elizondo (1996) as they suggest that protectionism leads to high industrial
concentration while Paluzie (2001) is more consistent with this observation.
Our paper is related to a few strands of the literature.
Firstly, our paper is related to the theoretical and empirical papers
about trade liberalization's eﬀect on industrial agglomeration. The models
of Krugman and Elizondo (1996) and Paluzie (2001) are motivated to ex-
plain episodes of trade liberalization in Mexico and the EU and they have
very diﬀerent implications.2 At the same time there are empirical papers
that examine the eﬀect of trade liberalization on geographical concentration
for many other episodes. (Hanson, 1998a,b; Sanguinetti and Martincus,
1Even in 2007 the last year of our sample and 6 years after China's WTO accession,
the average industrial agglomeration is still much lower than that in developed countries.
2Other theoretical work includes, e.g., Ades and Glaeser (1995) and Monfort and
Nicolini (2000).
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2009; Sjöberg and Sjöholm, 2009; Henderson and Kuncoro, 1996; Pernia
and Quising, 2003) Our paper contributes to this strand of literature by
studying the episode of Chinese trade liberalization. Our identiﬁcation is
more robust and has a reliable causal implication. The mechanism similar
to Paluzie (2001) is supported by our paper at least for the Chinese episode.
Secondly, our paper is related to the papers study China's industrial
location and agglomeration. Young (2000) and Poncet (2003) argue that
local protectionism contributes to the fragmentation and lack of integration
of Chinese domestic market. Gao (2000) ﬁnds that provinces with more
trade and FDI experience faster industrial growth, and gain in their shares
of industries over the period of 1985-1997. Bai et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
less geographical concentration is found in industries where the past tax-
plus-proﬁt margins and the share of state-owned enterprise (SOEs) are
high, reﬂecting stronger local government protection of these industries. Lu
and Tao (2009) ﬁnd that the extent of industrial agglomeration in China,
measured by Ellison-Glaeser (EG) Index is rising steadily but still much
lower than those of developed countries. Local protectionism is found to
obstruct the process of geographic concentration of Chinese manufacturing
industries. Our paper contributes to this strand of research by studying
the eﬀect of trade liberalization on China's geographical concentration and
we ﬁnd trade liberalization increases the extent of industrial agglomeration
in China.
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Thirdly, our paper is related to the literature studies the eﬀect of trade
liberalization on Chinese economy. Brandt et al. (2012b) identify the ef-
fect of increased import competition on ﬁrm performance and productivity
growth. Han et al. (2012) examine the eﬀect of globalization on wage
inequality exploring trade liberalization shocks in China including its ac-
cession to WTO. Lu and Yu (2015) ﬁnd that mark-up dispersion and thus
resource misallocation in China is reduced after its accession to WTO. Our
paper provides another dimension (i.e., spatial dimension) through which
China's trade liberalization aﬀects the economy.
Section 1.2 describes the data we used, the construction of industrial
agglomeration measures, and China's WTO accession. Section 1.3 elabo-
rates the model and simulation results. Section 1.4 reviews the empirical
speciﬁcation and identiﬁcations assumptions while empirical ﬁndings are
presented in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data
The main dataset used in our paper is the Annual Survey of Industrial
Firms (ASIF), conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China
for the period of 1998-2007. It is a establishment-level dataset with a rich
set of information. This survey cover all state-owned enterprises and those
non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of ﬁve million yuan or above
in China. There establishments are distributed among 30 two-digit (or 164
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three-digit, 464 four-digit) manufacturing industries and across China's 31
provinces (including 4 municipalities), 344 cities, and 2829 counties.3
During the sample period there were several changes in China's admin-
istrative bound-areas and consequently in the city or county codes in our
dataset. For example, new counties were established, while existing coun-
ties were combined into larger ones or even elevated to cities. Using the
1999 National Standard (promulgated at the end of 1998 and called GB/T
2260-1999) as the benchmark codes, we convert the regional codes of all
the establishments to the benchmark codes to achieve consistency in the
regional codes throughout the sample period. Meanwhile a new classiﬁ-
cation system for industry codes (GB/T 4754-2002) was adopted in 2003
to replace the old classiﬁcation system (GB/T 4754-1994) that had been
used from 1995 to 2002. To achieve consistency in the industry codes for
the whole sample period (1998-2007) we convert the industry codes in the
1998-2007 data to an adjusted industry classiﬁcation system. (Brandt et
al., 2012a).
Chinese import tariﬀ data is downloaded from WTO. WTO provides
tariﬀ information 1996,1997, and 2001-present. We supplement the miss-
ing tariﬀ data of 1998-2000 from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)
3Our paper focuses on 148 three-digit industries which exclude tobacco industry and
beverage industry. The tobacco industry is excluded due to few observation and heavy
government protection. The beverage industry is excluded as it includes, for example,
Chinese spirits and herbal tea which are unique to Chinese market and are also heavily
regulated.
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which is maintained by World Bank. WTO or WITS provides tariﬀ data
at HS 6-digit level. As HS coding system changed in 2002 and 2007 we
match the HS 1996 codes (used for 1996-2001) and the HS 2007 codes
(used for 2007) to the HS 2002 codes (used for 2002-2006) using standard
concordance table. There are 5036 HS 6-digit products from Chinese man-
ufacturing industries. As our dependent variable, measures of industrial
agglomeration, is at industry level, we match HS 6-digit products to the
adjusted industry classiﬁcation and compute one industry's import tariﬀ
as the simple average of the import tariﬀs of its HS 6-level products.4
In addition, we use export tariﬀ data of Chinese products downloaded
from WTO and WITS and an input-output table of Chinese industries. We
calculate an industry's export tariﬀ and input tariﬀ given these data.
1.2.1 Measures of Industrial Agglomeration
We aggregate establishment-level output or value-added to industry and
region-industry level to calculate industrial agglomeration measures for
Chinese industries.5
There are three industrial agglomeration measures often used in the
literature. Gini Index, Gi =
∑M
r=1(sr − xr)2, in which sr is the share of
industry i's output in area r and xr is the share of total output in area r, is
4We thank Zhang Yifan for sharing this concordance.
5In principle, output, labor, or value added can all be used to calculate EG or MS
index. As labor hoarding eﬀect is signiﬁcant in China, we prefer to use output as our
benchmark while value added is used for robustness check.
7
a raw measure of industrial agglomeration proposed by Krugman (1991).
However, even if establishments choose location independently the industry
will be regarded as localized if its output is concentrated in a small number
of ﬁrms in a limited geographical area using this index and thus this index
may fail to accurately measure industrial agglomeration.
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) propose models in which plants may choose
their location to beneﬁt from natural advantage of one particular geograph-
ical area or spillover generated by the proximity to other plants in the same
industry. They construct a model-based measure (called EG index) of geo-
graphical concentration which takes industrial structure into account. The








in which Gi is industry i's Gini index, xr is area r's share of total output ,
and Hi is industry i's Herﬁndahl index.
Maurel and Sédillot (1999) construct a similar measure (called MS in-
dex) of geographical concentration from a location model in line of Ellison
















in which sr is the share of industry i's output in area sr, xr is the share of
total output in area r and Hi is industry i's Herﬁndahl index.
As the two models in Ellison and Glaeser (1997) are observationally
8
equivalent Maurel and Sédillot (1999) only consider spillover and obtain
the MS index directly from a probability model. It turns out that EG
index and MS index are unbiased estimator of the same parameter which
governs the interdependence of plants' location decision in one industry. We
use EG index as our benchmark measure of industrial agglomeration and
use MS as well as Gini index as a robustness check.6 Table 1.1 calculates
the correlation of industrial agglomeration measures. EG indexes and MS
indexes are highly correlated while Gini index, which doesn't adjust for
industrial structure, is less correlated with either EG indexes or MS indexes.
China's industrial agglomeration is low relative to developed countries
(Young, 2000; Lu and Tao, 2009) and has increased from 1998 to 2007
as shown in Figure 1.1. Much of that increase of occurred after 2002 or
China's accession to WTO. In Table 1.2, summary statistics for γego , or
EG index calculated using output, suggests that industrial agglomeration
increases across the distribution.7 The pattern observed in Figure 1.1 is a
general story.
6We also calculate these indexes using output or value-added. γtypevariable is a measure
of industrial agglomeration of type ∈ {EG,MS,Gini} and calculated using variable ∈
{output, value-added}
7The only exception is the maximum which starts to decrease from 2004. However, as
the distribution is particularly skewed on the right or a very limited number of industries'
industrial agglomeration is much higher than the rest, the decrease of the maximum may
be due to some unusual changes speciﬁc to such industries.
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1.2.2 China's Accession to WTO
In July 1986, China notiﬁed the GATT (the predecessor of WTO) her
willingness to resume her status as a GATT contracting party and it took
15 years before China eventually joined WTO in Dec 2001. Between 1986
and 1992, the return to GATT is suspended as China was debating whether
she should continue market reform or move back to the planned economy
system. The momentum resumed after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour
speech in 1992. In 1994 China accelerated its drive to GATT but China
failed to become a founding member of WTO which replaced GATT in Jan
1995. Then it took another 6 years before China ﬁnally joins WTO. As
a commitment to GATT (or WTO), China carried out widespread tariﬀ
reduction from 1992 to 1997 but China's tariﬀ barely changed from 1998 to
2001 as it negotiated bilaterally with WTO members. Since the beginning
of 2002, China started to fulﬁll her tariﬀ reduction responsibility as a WTO
member. The tariﬀ reduction would be mostly completed by 2004 according
to the WTO accession agreement. The average tariﬀs of agriculture and
manufacturing goods would be reduced to 15% and 8.9% respectively.
The (un-weighted) average tariﬀ from 1996 to 2007 is plotted in Figure
1.3. Tariﬀ rates dropped substantially in 1996 and remained relatively
stable between 1997 and 2001. The tariﬀ reduction resumed from 2002
until a steady state was reached around 2005. In Figure 1.3 it is also shown
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that the ratio of tariﬀs at the 25th percentile over those at 75 percentile
also has a sharp drop from 2002 and was stabilized after 2005.
Interestingly, there is substantial variation of tariﬀ reduction across
industries upon WTO accession. China is required to reduce her tariﬀs
to the WTO-determined levels which are quite uniform across products
whereas China's pre-WTO tariﬀs varies across products. In Figure 1.4,
we plot the changes in tariﬀ between 2001 and 2005 against the tariﬀs in
2001 for industries. This ﬁgure suggests that there is a strong and positive
correlation, implying that industries with higher tariﬀs before the WTO
accession experienced more tariﬀ reduction afterwards.
1.3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we use a simple model based on Paluzie (2001) and illustrate
how trade liberalization aﬀects industry agglomeration.
1.3.1 Setup
Consider a world with three regions: regions, 1 and 2, are located in the
same country, referred to as Home, and region 0 is located in a foreign
country referred to as Foreign. There are two sectors, one with a ho-
mogeneous good produced using the constant returns to scale technology
(referred to as Agriculture sector) and the other with a variety of diﬀer-
entiated goods produced using the increasing returns to scale technology
(referred to as Manufacturing sector). The representative consumer in all
11







, 0 < µ < 1, (1.3)
where r ∈ {1, 2, 3} indexes regions; µ is the expenditure share of manfac-
turing sector; QAr is the consumption of agriculture good; and Q
M
r is the








, 0 < ρ < 1, (1.4)
where i ∈ {1, ..., n} indexes the variety of manufacturing goods; qMr (i) is
the consumption of manufacturing good i in region r; and σ = 1/(1− ρ) is
the constant elasticity of substitution. Agriculture goods are freely traded
across regions so that the wage rates in the agriculture are equalized in all
regions and are used as the numeraire (normalized to 1). Given the utility










where pMi (i) is the price of the variety i; P
M
r is the composite price index









and Yr is the total income in region r, i.e.,
Yr = wrλrµ+ (1− µ)/3, (1.7)
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where wr is the manufacturing wage rate in region r. To save notation,
we drop i in the following analysis as each manufacturing ﬁrm produces a
unique variety. Labor is the only production factor used in both agriculture
and manufacturing sectors. We assume that labor employed in the agricul-
ture sector is tied to the land and hence immobile (both across sectors and
across regions). Labor employed in the manufacturing sector is allowed to
be mobile between regions 1 and 2 in the home country, but not between the
two countries. The share of the world manufacturing labour force equals to
the expenditure share of manufacturing goods, i.e., LM = µ and the world
agriculture labour force LA = 1 − µ (for similar assumption, see Fujita et
al. (1999)). The agriculture labor force is assumed to be evenly distributed
among the three regions, i.e., LAr = (1− µ)/3. Meanwhile, the share of the
manufacturing labor force is denoted as λr, i.e., L
M




and λ1 +λ2 =
2
3
. To produce an output of qMr manufacturing goods
for any variety in region r, the labor required is
lMr = F + cq
M
r , (1.8)
where F and c are the ﬁxed cost and constant marginal cost respectively.
Firms are allowed to freely enter and exit the manufacturing sector.
The transportation of manufacturing goods face an iceberg type ship-
ment cost. Speciﬁcally, for one unit of export to arrive in the foreign
country (i.e, region 0), τF > 1 units of goods must be shipped from the
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home country (i.e., region 1 or region 2). For one of unit of import to arrive
the home country (i.e., region 1 or region 2), τH > 1 units of goods must
be shipped from region 0. For one unit of goods to arrive in region 1 from
region 2 and vice versa, τ > 1 units of goods must be shipped from the
origin.
1.3.2 Firm Behavior
Given Equation (1.5) and (1.8) and transportation cost described, proﬁt
maximization by a ﬁrm in region r selling in region r′ leads to the optimal
pricing
pMrr′ = wrτrr′c/ρ, (1.9)

















The free entry and exit condition implies that
Πr = 0. (1.11)









(σ − 1) (1.12)
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From Equation (1.12), all ﬁrms have the same size of labor employment
F (σ − 1) and the number of ﬁrms within region r, i.e.,
nr =
LMr
F (σ − 1) =
λrµ
F (σ − 1) (1.13)












We adopt similar normalization, c = ρ and F = µ/(σ − 1) as in Krugman
and Elizondo (1996) and Paluzie (2001). The manufacturing price index







In addition, we have manufacturing wage equation in region r similar to














Given a value for λ1 we have nine equations (i.e., three income equations
(1.7),three price index equations (1.15) and three wage equations (1.16))
and nine unknown variables (i.e., Yr, P
M
r and wr). In addition, we have






where ωr is the real manufacturing wage in region r. The equilibrium
manufacturing distribution or the equilibrium value of λ1 is such that the
real wage diﬀerence between two Home regions is zero, i.e., ω1 = ω2. In
the numerical example, σ = 6, µ = 0.4, τ, τF = 1.75, and λ0 = 1/3.
In Figure 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7, we set τH = 1.9, 1.3, and 1.1 respectively to
simulate a process of trade liberalization. When international trade cost is
high (τH = 1.9), local demand makes an even distribution of manufactur-
ing the only stable equilibrium. At intermediate international trade cost
(τH = 1.3) an even distribution or industrial concentration is a stable equi-
librium. Finally when trade liberalization reach a critical level (τH = 1.1),
industrial concentration become the only stable equilibrium. The immobile
sector in this model acts as a pull. Before the trade liberalization with little
import competition local demand from the immobile agriculture sector is
suﬃcient to pull manufacturing production locally to have a stable even
distribution of manufacturing. When trade liberalization takes place, for-
eign competition intensiﬁes and an even distribution is eventually unstable
as the pull of local demand is weakened. The only trade cost gradually
reduced in our simulation is the import trade cost. Hence our simulation
isolates the eﬀect of trade liberalization on geographical concentration and




The industries with higher tariﬀs before WTO accession experienced more
import tariﬀ reduction and thus more trade liberalization afterwards. These
diﬀerences in the degree of trade liberalization and a clear timing of trade
liberalization make a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation possible. We es-
sentially compare the change in the agglomeration of industries with high
tariﬀs before 2002 (treatment group) with the change in the agglomera-
tion of industries with lower tariﬀs before 2002 (control group) as a result
of China's access to WTO and thus identify the eﬀect of trade liberaliza-
tion on industrial agglomeration. The baseline econometric speciﬁcation of
estimation is
yit = α0 + αi + λt +X
′
itγ + βTariﬀi,2001 × Post02t + it, (1.18)
where i and t respectively represent industry and year; yit is the mea-
sure of the industrial agglomeration; αi and λt are the industry and year
ﬁxed eﬀects, capturing all time-invariant diﬀerences across industries and
all yearly shocks common to all industries; Tariﬀi,2001 is the tariﬀ rate of
industry i in 2001; Post02t is an indicator which takes a value of 1 if it is
a year after 2001 and 0 otherwise; X
′
itγ is a set of control variables; and
it is the error term. As suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004), the standard
errors are clustered at industry level.
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1.4.2 Identiﬁcation Assumption and Checks
Our speciﬁcation of DID estimation as Equation (1.18) is valid only if the
regressor of our interest, Tariﬀi,2001×Post02t is uncorrelated with the error
term, it, conditional on a whole list of controls (αi, Xit, λt), i.e.,
E[it|Tariﬀi,2001 × Post02t, αi, Xit, λt] = E[it|αi, Xit, λt]. (1.19)
However, there may be a few concerns about the identiﬁcation assumption,
particularly, the timing of WTO accession, the non-random selection of
tariﬀs in 2001, and some other simultaneous policy reforms.
First of all, it would be a concern that the approval of China's WTO
accession by the end of 2001 was expected and ﬁrms could then adjust
their behavior even before tariﬀ reduction happened since 2002. Despite
China achieve important breakthroughs by signing agreements with EU
and the U.S in 1999 and 2000, there are still many leftovers unsolved un-
til the mid 2001. Hence the timing of China's WTO accession was quite
uncertain before 2001. Nonetheless, we have done a robustness check by
including an additional control, Tariﬀi,2001×Year01 (where Year01 is equal
to 1 if year = 2001 and 0 otherwise), to examine whether ﬁrms expect
China's WTO accession and adjust their behavior in advance to the ac-
tual accession. Secondly, the choice of these tariﬀs in 2001 is non-random,
creating concerns that our treatment and control groups could be system-
atically diﬀerent ex ante and these other diﬀerences instead of initial tariﬀ
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rates are driving changes in industrial agglomeration. We have regressed
Tariﬀi,2001 against a number of industrial characteristics in 2001 and the
result is presented in Table 1.2. It is found that Tariﬀi,2001 is signiﬁcantly
correlated with output share of SOEs, wage (in log), and export intensity
in 2001. We then control ﬂexibly for post-WTO diﬀerences in the time
path of our outcome variable generated by these pre-existing diﬀerences.
Speciﬁcally, we add in the interactions between each signiﬁcant tariﬀ de-
terminant and a 4th-order time trend. Lastly, in the early 2000s, there are
other policy reforms in China. The reform of SOE and the change of FDI
regulation are two notable cases. China may also experience export tariﬀ
reduction and input tariﬀ as a result of its accession to WTO. These policy
reforms may aﬀect our output variable through other channels. As in Lu
and Tao (2009) local protectionism proxied by the share of SOEs is found
to obstruct market forces and thus industrial agglomeration in China. An
industry with higher share of SOEs may experience either less changes in
industrial agglomeration due to the obstruction of local protectionism or
more changes in industrial agglomeration if the reform of SOE eﬀectively
reduces such local protectionism. The FDI inﬂow to China is not evenly
distributed across regions and regions with better business environment
and labor market are more attractive to foreign investors. An industry
that experiences large inﬂow of FDI may concentrate at such better de-
veloped regions. An industry that experiences more export tariﬀ or input
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tariﬀ reduction may concentrate at coastal regions where the trade cost is
lower to beneﬁt from better access to foreign demand or foreign inputs. We
control FDI (in log), the share of SOEs, export tariﬀ, and input tariﬀ in
our robustness check to address the potential eﬀects of other policy reforms
on our outcome variable.
1.5 Empirical Findings
1.5.1 Baseline Result
We present our baseline result of the DID speciﬁcation Equation (1.18) in
Table 1.3.
In Column (1) we add only the industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Our
regressor of interest, Tariﬀi2001×Post02t, is statistically signiﬁcant and pos-
itive, indicating that industry agglomeration measures has increased more
in industries with high tariﬀ in 2001 (treatment group) from 2002 onwards.
These industries have experienced more liberalization from 2002 onwards
and hence our result suggests that trade liberalization makes industries in
China more agglomerated.
As we have explained in Section 1.4 that industrial tariﬀs in 2001 are
correlated with output share of SOEs, wage (log), and export intensity in
2001 and there is concern that the time trend of industrial agglomeration
may be driven by these variables rather than industrial tariﬀs. In Column
(2), we further control interaction of these variables and a 4th-order time
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trend. The estimator is larger in size and statistically more signiﬁcant than
that in Column (1).
The agglomeration of an industry may be correlated with other vari-
ables. Lu and Tao (2009) suggest the use of new product ratio, purchased
inputs intensity, wage premium and average ﬁrm size to proxy spillover,
input sharing, labor pooling, and scale of economy. In Column (3), these
time-varing industrial characteristics are further included and this speciﬁ-
cation is our benchmark. The estimator is signiﬁcant and its size is similar
to that in Column (2).
1.5.2 Robustness Check
For robustness check, the speciﬁcation of Column (3) in Table 1.3 is used
as the benchmark and the result is presented in Table 1.4.
In Column (1) we do a placebo test by including an item which inter-
acts Tariﬀi,2001 andOne year before WTO Accession dummy.
8 The insigniﬁ-
cance and small size of the coeﬃcient of Tariﬀi,2001×One Year Before WTO
suggest there is no expectation eﬀect.
We further add in the variables that control the eﬀects of other policy
reforms on our outcome variable. In Column (2), we add FDI (in log) and
Share of SOEs to control the policy reform of foreign direct invest and
China's state-owned enterprises. In Column (3), we add export tariﬀ and
input tariﬀ to control export tariﬀ reduction and input tariﬀ reduction due
8The dummy is equal to one if it is 2001 and zero otherwise.
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to China's accession to WTO. The estimated coeﬃcient of Tariﬀi,2001 ×
Post02t in Column (1) to (3) remains signiﬁcant with a size similar to that
in the benchmark result from Column (3) of Table 1.3.
We follow Topalova (2010) to do another placebo test, looking at the
eﬀect of tariﬀs on industrial agglomeration in the pre-WTO period (1998-
2001). We should not expect any signiﬁcant eﬀect as tariﬀs did not change
much during that period. Otherwise that could indicate the existence of
some underlying confounding factors. As shown in Column (4) of Table 1.4,
we indeed ﬁnd that tariﬀs have almost zero eﬀect on industrial agglomera-
tion in the pre-WTO period. At last, we replace Tariﬀi,2001×Post02t using
interactions of Tariﬀi,2001 and a set of year dummies. This could identify
the eﬀect of trade liberalization on industrial agglomeration in each year.
As China joins WTO from 2002, we expect such terms to be small and in-
signiﬁcant for years before 2002 and larger and more signiﬁcant after 2002.
In Figure 1.8, the estimated coeﬃcients are indeed near zero before 2002
and become larger after 2002.9
1.5.3 Additional Robustness Check
Additional robustness checks are presented in Table 1.5. As γego is used
as our benchmark measure of industrial agglomeration, here we use alter-




v , in Column
9For signiﬁcance, all of the coeﬃcients before 2002 are insigniﬁcant while those after
2002 are more signiﬁcant and in some years (i.e., 2004, 2005) signiﬁcant at 10 % level.
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1 to Column 3. The estimated coeﬃcient of Tariﬀi,2001 × Post02t remains
robust with a similar magnitude as in our benchmark speciﬁcation. As
we calculate Tariﬀi,2001 as the average tariﬀ of HS 6-digit products. This
mapping from HS 6-digit products to the three-digit CIC industry might
conceal variations of tariﬀ reduction across HS 6-digit products in 3-digit
CIC industries, which could lead to underestimation of our trade liber-
alization eﬀect. We add an interaction between our regressor of interest
Tariﬀi,2001 × Post02t and the number of products within a three-digit in-
dustry. As shown in Column 4, the coeﬃcient of this triple interaction term
is small in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant, implying that indus-
tries with more HS 6-digit products does not behave diﬀerently from others
with fewer products. In our baseline estimation, the geographical unit for
calculating industrial agglomeration measure is city and we use province
and recalculate industrial agglomeration instead in Column 5. The coeﬃ-
cient of Tariﬀi,01 × Post02 remains positive and signiﬁcant and is larger in
magnitude.
In our benchmark speciﬁcation, the estimator βˆ may be expressed as:
βˆ = β + γ
corr(Tariﬀi,2001, it|αi, λt, Xit)
var(Tariﬀi,2001)
(1.20)
and it is unbiased if γ = 0 which cannot be known. Instead, given
{Tariﬀi,2001} we randomly assign a Tariﬀi,2001 to each industry, and ran-
domly assign a year of "treatment" to each industry as well, and we use
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Tariﬀrandi,2001 × PostXXi to replace Tariﬀi,2001 × Post02t in the benchmark
speciﬁcation.10 Its coeﬃcient βrand should be zero in this case. We ran-
domize for 500 times and plot the density of ˆβrand in Figure 1.9. The
distribution is centered at zero with mean of -0.0001 and standard error of
0.006 and our benchmark estimation is far from the distribution. The evi-
dence in Figure 1.9 suggests that our ﬁndings are less likely to be spurious.
(La Ferrara et al., 2012)
1.6 Conclusion
We ﬁnd the evidence that the more industries experienced more trade lib-
eralization in China have become more clustered using DID identiﬁcation.
Our ﬁnding is robust to a number of robustness checks. Our paper pro-
vides evidence contrary to the view that protectionist policy is responsible
for geographic concentration and that trade liberalization should lead to a
more even distribution of industries. Further, our papers provides another
explanation to China's increasing industrial agglomeration and another di-
mension (i.e., spatial dimension) through which trade liberalization aﬀects
the country.
10In one randomized assignment Tariﬀrandi,2001 is the tariﬀ given to industry i and
PostXXi is 1 if year is larger than XX and zero otherwise.
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1.7 Tables and Figures
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Fig. 1.2 Summary statistics for γego from 1998 to 2007
year N mean min max p25 p50 p75
1998 148 0.017 -0.004 0.121 0.005 0.011 0.021
1999 148 0.017 -0.004 0.135 0.005 0.011 0.022
2000 148 0.019 -0.005 0.141 0.006 0.013 0.022
2001 148 0.019 -0.013 0.146 0.006 0.012 0.022
2002 148 0.020 -0.005 0.185 0.007 0.013 0.023
2003 148 0.022 -0.003 0.195 0.007 0.014 0.025
2004 148 0.023 -0.008 0.169 0.008 0.016 0.028
2005 148 0.024 0.001 0.152 0.009 0.016 0.028
2006 148 0.026 0.002 0.121 0.011 0.018 0.034
2007 148 0.025 0.002 0.120 0.010 0.018 0.031
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Fig. 1.3 China's import tariﬀ from 1998 to 2007
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Tab. 1.2 Determinants of tariﬀs in 2001
Table 1:  Determinants of tariff rate in 2001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
D.V. Tariffs in 2001 
                
output share of SOEs (2001) 0.081 0.249* 0.433*** 0.432*** 0.436*** 0.434*** 0.436*** 
 
(0.100) (0.138) (0.165) (0.164) (0.167) (0.166) (0.167) 
output share of other domestic firms (2001) -0.163** -0.120 0.070 0.070 0.065 0.070 0.066 
 
(0.078) (0.079) (0.105) (0.106) (0.108) (0.106) (0.108) 
Log total employment (2001) -0.001 -0.021 -0.033 -0.032 -0.034 -0.033 -0.034 
 
(0.009) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
employment growth rate (98-01) 0.015 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.056) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) 
Log average wage per worker (2001) 
 
0.027 0.039* 0.039* 0.040* 0.039* 0.040* 
  
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
capital-labor ratio (2001) 
 
-0.030* -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
  
(0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
value added ratio (2001) 
 
-0.049 -0.051 -0.054 -0.044 -0.049 -0.044 
  
(0.084) (0.083) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) 
industry age (2001) 
 
-0.042 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.025 
  
(0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Export intensity (2001) 
  
0.212** 0.207** 0.224** 0.216** 0.223** 
   
(0.101) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
Theil 
   
0.496 
   
    
(1.781) 
   Gini 
   
 -0.319 
  
    
 (0.572) 
  CV 


















Constant 0.266* 0.521* 0.206 0.206 0.222 0.209 0.222 
 
(0.158) (0.285) (0.303) (0.303) (0.305) (0.303) (0.305) 
    
 
   Observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 
R-squared 0.085 0.116 0.136 0.137 0.138 0.136 0.138 
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
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Tab. 1.3 Baseline results
Dependent variable
EG (output) (1) (2) (3)
0.0266* 0.0359** 0.0338**
[0.0158] [0.0166] [0.0152]
Time varying industry characteristics X
Interaction of time polynomial and covariates X X
Industry fixed effects X X X
Year fixed effects X X X
Observations 1,480 1,480 1,480
R-squared 0.8442 0.8476 0.8490
Standard errors clustered at 3-digit industry level in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
       ,     ∗     02 
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Tab. 1.4 Robustness check
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)





FDI (in log) -0.0005 -0.0006
[0.0009] [0.0008]








Time varying industry characteristics X X X X
Interaction of time polynomial and covariates X X X X
Industry fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Observations 1,480 1,480 1,480 592
R-squared 0.8490 0.8499 0.8497 0.9401
Standard errors clustered at 3-digit industry level in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
       ,     ∗     02 
       ,     ∗                               
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Tab. 1.5 Additional robustness checks




Measures of industrial agglomeration MS (Output) Gini (Output) EG (Value Added) EG (Output) EG (Output)
0.0353** 0.0503* 0.0306** 0.0381** 0.0556*
[0.0149] [0.0262] [0.0144] [0.0160] [0.0319]
-0.0000
[0.0000]
Controls X X X X X
Observations 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,480
R-squared 0.8544 0.7316 0.8013 0.8496 0.8596
Standard robust erroros clustered at 3-digit industry level in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *. p<0.1
Controls include industry and year fixed effect and all time-varing industrial characteristics, interaction of time polynomial and 
covariates of 2001 3-digit industry tariff.
ProvinceAlternative measures
       ,     ∗     02 
       ,     ∗     02  ∗ #            
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Linder (1961) hypothesizes that countries with similar demand structure
will trade more with one and another. The idea is that goods are produced
where they are most demanded and when available to export they will be
exported to countries where they are demanded as well. Given its intuitive
appeal, considerable eﬀorts are concentrated on its empirical testing. Em-
pirical tests of this hypothesis are usually focused on its implication that
there should be disproportionately more trade between countries of similar
income per capital.
As one prominent alternative to the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin
model, "Linder Hypothesis" is only loosely formulated in theoretical terms.
The lack of a more rigorous theoretical foundation and thus a theory-
consistent estimation method could be responsible for the remarkably elu-
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sive empirical support for "Linder Hypothesis". Theoretical foundation
of gravity equation and theory-consistent estimation methods have been
developed progressively in the last two decades. (Mayer, 2014). The devel-
opment of theoretical foundation for "Linder Hypothesis" is, however, not
particularly the focal point of this evolution.
Hallak (2010) ﬁnds that "Linder Hypothesis" is missing for aggregate
trade ﬂow and it exists only for diﬀerentiated goods at sector level. Thus
he argues the missing "Linder Hypothesis" for aggregate trade ﬂow is a
result of aggregation bias. In this paper, we present why international pro-
duction fragmentation may contribute to the missing "Linder Hypothesis"
for aggregate trade ﬂow. Firstly, we develop a model of international pro-
duction fragmentation from which we derive nonstandard gravity equations
for bilateral gross trade ﬂow and value-added trade ﬂow. An additive "Lin-
der Term" appears only in the gravity equation for value-added trade ﬂow
(in log). Secondly, we provide empirical evidence for the main idea of our
paper, tracing "Linder Hypothesis" in value-added terms.
International production fragmentation involves the production pro-
cesses stretched across multiple countries and are ﬁrst noted by Belassa
(1967) and Findlay (1978).1 Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2011) and Dedrick et al.
(2010) provide case studies of international production fragmentation for
1International production fragmentation is also called vertical specialization, out-
sourcing or global value chain. We stick to international production fragmentation in
the paper
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Nokia N95 and iPod. In the absence of international production fragmen-
tation, the production of any good is completed within one country and
it is consumed (absorbed) in the immediate importing country whenever
exported. Then gross trade ﬂow should reﬂect the similarity of demand
structure if it does play a role in international trade and thus could be used
to test "Linder Hypothesis". However, in the presence of international pro-
duction fragmentation, gross trade ﬂow may miss the "Linder Hypothesis"
even when the similarity of demand structure inﬂuences international trade
in the way hypothesized by Linder.
For the moment let's suppose that "Linder Hypothesis" is true to the
extend that similarity of demand structure inﬂuences international trade
and there is no international production fragmentation. "Linder Hypoth-
esis" predicts Japan trade disproportionately more directly with the U.S.
and both the U.S and Japan trade much less directly with China. The mea-
sured gross trade ﬂow should in turn reﬂect "Linder Hypothesis". However,
in the presence of international production fragmentation, although Japan
and US demand disproportionately more ﬁnal goods from each other China
may become an assembly platform such that China trade a lot (intermedi-
ate inputs and assembled outputs) with the U.S and Japan and the direct
trade between the U.S and Japan shrinks. Therefore gross trade ﬂows may
no longer reﬂect "Linder Hypothesis" and instead we may need to trace
"Linder Hypothesis" in value-added trade ﬂows as proposed in this pa-
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per. "Triangle trade" where the north exports intermediate inputs to the
south and the assembled ﬁnal goods is exported back to the north is of
particularly relevance for our paper. International production fragmenta-
tion may involve complex organization and our model is built such that it
accommodates "triangle trade" and remains relatively tractable.
Our paper is ﬁrstly related to the international production fragmenta-
tion literature which has inspired our theoretical framework. In Baldwin
(2006) international production fragmentation is the "second (great) un-
bundling" which is referred as "the end of the need to perform most man-
ufacturing stages near each other". Baldwin and Venables (2013) model
two conﬁgurations of international production fragmentation i.e., "spider"
and "snake". Yi (2003, 2010) oﬀer good insights into how the international
production fragmentation may help understanding the growth of trade and
the home bias in trade. Our paper instead studies the implication of in-
ternational production fragmentation on "Linder Hypothesis". Our model
abstracts from (potentially) complex (and multiple) conﬁgurations of inter-
national production fragmentation and adopts a two-stage "snake" model
that produces an updated gravity equation. Noguera (2012) and Lai and
Qi (2014) are the closest to our paper as their work also attempt to derive
gravity model of value-added trade ﬂow. Our paper diﬀers from theirs in
our conﬁguration of international production fragmentation i.e., a two-stage
"snake" which is to accommodate "triangle trade" and the incorporation
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of supply and demand of quality which is essential to generate the "Linder
Term". The pioneer work of Hummels et al. (2001) measure the use of the
imported inputs in producing goods that are exported which they call ver-
tical specialization. The more recent work of Johnson and Noguera (2012)
and Koopman et al. (2008, 2012, 2014) have proposed accounting methods
to decompose the domestic and foreign contents in gross trade ﬂow and
trace the value-added content of gross trade ﬂow using global input-output
tables. Our paper uses the value-added trade ﬂow calculated based on
Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Koopman et al. (2014).
Our paper is related to the literature on "Linder Hypothesis". Empiri-
cal test of "Linder Hypothesis" or its implication that countries of similar
income should trade more spans over decades. By calculating bilateral
average propensities to import and graphing them, for a given exporter,
opposite the per capita income of the importers Linder provides some sup-
port for the hypothesis. (Deardorﬀ, 1984). However, the problem of such
tests is that countries with similar income also tend to be clustered geo-
graphically. (Hoftyzer, 1975; Kennedy and McHugh, 1980). To account for
transportation cost, gravity equation of cross sections of gross trade is used
to test Linder hypothesis. The early empirical gravity models suﬀers from
the lack of theoretical foundation as well as the speciﬁcations errors as the
theoretical foundation and the estimation of gravity model matures only
recently. Hallak (2010) derives a gravity equation with "Linder term". His
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work highlights the importance of product diﬀerentiation in testing "Linder
Hypothesis".2 Our paper aims to explain the missing "Linder Hypothesis"
in gross trade ﬂow on account of international production fragmentation.
Section 2.2 presents the model. The data used in the paper is described
in Section 3.2. Section 2.4 presents empirical evidence and Section 3.6
concludes.
2.2 Model
There are N countries and each country i ∈ N produces a variety of ﬁnal
goods in our model. For each variety of ﬁnal goods, it requires two se-
quential stages of production and the quality of a ﬁnal good depends on its
ﬁrst stage of production. This organization of production sharing is a short
snake described in Baldwin and Venables (2013) and similar to sequential
production sharing in Yi (2003). Country i which provides the ﬁrst-stage
of a ﬁnal good is considered the country of origin for this product and in
turn we say this ﬁnal good is a good of country i. The second-stage of
production may be completed in any n ∈ N and the completion of a ﬁnal
good may involve two countries if n 6= i. Only the ﬁrst-stage input has
quality and thus the quality of a ﬁnal good only depends on the income
level of its country of origin.
2The idea that product diﬀerentiation matters for testing "Linder Hypothesis" is,
however, not new. (Deardorﬀ, 1984)
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2.2.1 Demand
The demand side of our model is based on but diﬀerent from Hallak (2006,
2010). This model provides a convenient way to incorporate nonhomoth-
eticity and delivers a "Linder Term" in our paper.
The representative consumer in each country j ∈ N derive utility from











where θi is the quality of ﬁnal goods of country i; γj measures the intensity
of preference for quality of country j; qi is a composite good of all varieties







σ−1 where v is some variety; and
σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The intensity of preference for
quality of country j is associated with its income level, speciﬁcally
γj = µ0 + µ ln yj, (2.2)
where µ0, µ > 0; and ln yj is the income per capita of country j. This
utility function has two tiers. The consumers diﬀerentiates ﬁnal goods by
country of origin while the varieties of the same country are of the same








































The sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the term in square brack-
ets as σ > 1, that is, on whether the quality of ﬁnal goods from country
i is above or below the (weighted) average quality. If the quality of coun-
try i's ﬁnal goods is higher (lower) than the average quality, expenditure
share sji increases (decrease) with the intensity of preference for quality.
Together with Equation (2.2), countries with higher income level spend a
larger proportion of their income on higher-quality goods, capturing the
demand side of Linder's theory.
2.2.2 Production





where X is the diﬀerentiated input with quality diﬀerentiation; and A is the
assembly input with no quality diﬀerentiation. The parameter α measures
the input share of assembly. The ﬁrst-stage production, X, is local and
the second-stage production, A, can be and sourced form other countries.
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For a ﬁnal good, its quality is determined by the quality of X. The quality
associated each ﬁnal good of country i, θi, is correlated with its income
level:
ln θi = δ0 + δ ln yi + ιi, (2.8)
where δ0, δ > 0; ln yi is the income per capita of country i (in log); and
ιi is some idiosyncratic error. Without quality diﬀerentiation, input A is
sourced globally under perfect competition as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
For each variety of ﬁnal good of country i, it sources globally for the
assembly platform. To minimize the overall cost to serve country j, some








in which pxi and p
a
n are the unit cost of input X in country i and the unit
cost of input A in country n; and dni or djn is iceberg trade cost for shipping
from country i to country n or shipping from country n to country j.3
Labor is the only factor of production. The production of one unit of
X requires one unit of labor such that the unit cost of input X pxi = wi
for any country i. The productivity to produce the second-stage input A
in any country n is drawn from the Fréchet distribution
Fn(z) = e
−Tnz−θ , (2.10)
where Tn > 0 for all countries i = 1, 2, ...., N ; and θ > 1. These distribution
3The usual assumption of iceberg trade cost, i.e., dii = 1 and djndni > dji is assumed.
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are treated as independent across countries. See Fieler (2011) for example,
for the discussions of the Fréchet distribution and the role of parameters.





in which wn is the wage in country n. The overall cost, if country i employs























The price distribution country j actually facing for country i's variety given
the well-known properties of Fréchet distribution is




1− Pr[(wi)1−αdjnd1−αni (pan)α ≤ p]
}
(2.13)
Country n will serve as the assembly platform to serve country j if the over-
all cost is minimized. The probability that country n being the assembly















pijni is larger if (a) country n has some absolute advantage in assembly
or Tn is larger; (b) country n has a low labor cost, or wn is lower; (c)
country n, as the assembly platform between country i and j, has lower




ni is smaller. Given Equation (2.14), the
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pijni is also the share of expenditure of country j on goods of coun-
try i which are assembled in country n and conditional on varieties being
assembled in any country n the price index of such variates is pji as well.
2.2.3 Trade ﬂows
The trade ﬂows of in our model can be illustrated in Figure 2.1. The gross
trade ﬂow from country i to country j, GTji, has two components:
• ∑Nn=1 pijinEjsjn, the value of ﬁnal goods assembled by country i and
shipped to country j for consumption;
• ∑Nn=1 pinjiEnsni 1−αdnj , the value of ﬁrst-stage input X shipped from
country i to country j for assembly.
Ej and En are the total expenditure of country j and country n; sjn and
sni are expenditure shares deﬁned in Equation (2.3); and pijin and pinji
are deﬁned in Equation (2.14). For the ﬁrst component country i is the
assembly platform for country n and the quality input is from country n
which supplies the ﬁrst-stage input X. The demand by country j is thus
associated with the quality of ﬁnal goods of country n. For the second
component, country j is the assembly center receiving ﬁrst-stage input X
49












The value-added trade ﬂow from country i to country j, VATji, is de-
ﬁned as the value added content of country i being consumed by country
j and has two components:
• ∑Nn=1 pijinEjsjn(1 − 1−αdji ), the value of second-stage input A of ﬁnal
goods assembled by country i and shipped to country j for consump-
tion;
• ∑Nn=1 pijniEjsji 1−αdjn , the value of ﬁrst-stage input X of country i con-
sumed by country j.
For the ﬁrst component country i is the assembly platform and has no
quality input. The demand by country j is associated with the quality of
goods from country n which supplies the ﬁrst-stage input X. The second
component, on the other hand, is the consumption of all ﬁnal goods of
country i through all possible assembly platforms. The supply and demand
of the second component produces the "Linder Term".














We substitute sji as in Equation (2.3), move the ﬁrst component to the
left, and then take log












+ (1− σ) ln pji − (σ − 1)δµ
2
( ln yi − ln yj)2 + λi + λj + ji,
(2.18)
where λ0 is a collection of constant terms; λi is a collection of terms of
country i;λj is a collection of terms of country j; ln pji is price index for
ﬁnal goods of country i faced by country j; ( ln yi− ln yj)2 is the "Linder
term" and its coeﬃcient − (σ−1)δµ
2
< 0, reﬂecting the "Linder Hypothesis";
and ji is the error term.
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Barring its estimation, we take a few messages from the updated gravity
equation i.e., Equation (2.18). Firstly, in the context of our model with
international production fragmentation, value added ﬂow which connects
the supply and demand of quality contains an additive "Linder term" from
theory while gross trade ﬂow does not. Secondly, the dependent variable
is value-added trade ﬂow and speciﬁcally the ﬁrst-stage input of country i
consumed by country j. Since only the ﬁrst-stage input has quality it is the
correct and only component which should reﬂect "Linder Hypothesis" and
be associated with "Linder Term" as in Equation (2.18). Lastly, the RHS







and a bilateral price index ln pji both arise on account of international




+ ln(1 − α), λi = (σ − 1)
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, λj = (σ −
1)
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2.3.1 Value-added trade ﬂow
Gross trade ﬂow is available while value-added trade ﬂow as in Section
2.2.3 is not common. Given inter-country input-output tables, Johnson and
Noguera (2012) and Koopman et al. (2014) recently provide a methodol-
ogy to obtain bilateral value-added trade ﬂow. We download World Input-
Output Tables from World Input-Output Database (WIOD). (Timmer et
al., 2015). It has 40 countries and 35 industries from 1995 to 2011. In
addition, we also use Inter-Country Input-Output tables for 1995, 2000,
2005 from WTO-OECD TiVA Database (TiVA). It has 57 countries and
37 industries. See Table 2.1 to Table 2.4 for the lists of countries and indus-
tries in WIOD and TiVA Input-Output Tables. Johnson (2014) provides
information on other inter-country input output tables currently available.
Bilateral value-added trade ﬂow (VATji) can be obtained applying Johnson
and Noguera (2012) and Koopman et al. (2014)'s methodology given these
inter-country input-output tables. VATji is used e.g., to adjusted bilateral
current deﬁcit in Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Koopman et al. (2014).
Noguera (2012) uses VATji in a gravity model. Bilateral gross trade ﬂow
(GTji) is obtained from the tables as well.
5
5Bilateral gross trade ﬂow is available in a few commonly used databases, e.g., UN
Comtrade. Nonetheless, it can be found in inter-country input-output tables as well. The
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2.3.2 Gravity and income
The gravity dataset we use includes a rich set of variables which measures
bilateral trade costs (bilateral accessibility), including e.g., bilateral dis-
tance and contiguity.6 The income per capita data is from penn world table







Gravity equation is ﬁrst used in Tinbergen et al. (1962) for economics and
considered as deriving from some murky analogy with gravity equation in
physics. The theoretical heritage of gravity equation is characterized as
being "dubious" (Deardorﬀ, 1984) in the early decades. Over the past two
decades, substantial eﬀort of trade theorists have established rich theoreti-
cal foundations for gravity equation as well as theory-consistent estimation
methods. (Mayer, 2014) In particular, economists have come to the con-
aggregate bilateral trade ﬂow found in these tables is consistent with other databases.
Since the bilateral value-added trade ﬂow is calculated from these tables, for the purpose
of comparison, we prefer to use the gross trade ﬂows found in these tables.
6The set of bilateral variables include bilateral distance, contiguity, common oﬃcial
language, regional trade agreement, common ethnic language, common legal system,
common currency, common colonial link, common colonial link after 1945, colonial rela-
tionship in history, and current colonial link which is downloaded from CEPII (Head et
al., 2010). In addition, we add dummies of common continent and common communist
history. Common continent is equal to 1 if both countries are in the same continent and
0 otherwise, and common communist history is equal to 1 if both countries were/are
under communist regime.
7We use ppp adjusted income per capita as Hallak (2010)
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sensus to include importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimation,
ln GTji = ln G+ ln Si + ln Mj + ln φji + υji, (2.19)
where ln G is some gravity constant; ln Si and ln Mj represents "capa-
bilities" of exporter and "capacities" of importer respectively; ln φji is a
set of variables which measure "bilateral accessibility"; and υ is the error
term. When the components of φji are of primary interest, using ﬁxed
eﬀects to take care of ln Si and ln Mj will yield consistent estimates.





for the sample of countries in WIOD
and TiVA in 1995, 2000, and 2005 and the result is presented in Table 2.5.
A signiﬁcant and positive estimated coeﬃcient of "Linder Term", similar to
the estimation for aggregate trade ﬂow in Hallak (2010), suggests countries
with larger income gap trade more with one and another which is against
"Linder Hypothesis".
The gravity equation in our paper, i.e., Equation (2.18), in our pa-
per diﬀers substantially from standard gravity equation as in Equation






pijinEjsjn) i.e., ﬁrst stage value-added of country i consumed by
country j (in log) rather than ln GTji i.e., gross export from country i to
country j (in log). Secondly, the RHS of Equation 2.18 is diﬀerent from and
much more complex than Equation (2.19). In comparison with Equation
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and the price index (1− σ) ln pji.
The weighted accessibility term occurs due to international production
fragmentation in the absence of which it becomes −ln dji, the usual bilat-
eral trade cost term in standard gravity equation. 8 The "bilateral" price
index price is new and cannot be absorbed by country ﬁxed eﬀects.
We do not estimate Equation (2.18) in our paper. Instead we keep
the RHS of the standard gravity model i.e., Equation (2.19) including a
"Linder term" and empirically test the main prediction of our model: the
use of value added trade ﬂow may contribute to the recovery of "Linder
Hypothesis". Firstly, we replace gross trade ln GTji with value-added trade
ln V ATji.
The result of in Table 2.5 is the benchmark to assess if this correction




i.e, VAX ratio, on the RHS of Equation (2.19).
Intuitively, the estimated coeﬃcient of "Linder term " in this regression
assesses whether VATji is smaller relative to GTji when income is more
dissimilar. The VAX is ﬁrstly used by Johnson and Noguera (2012) as a
measure of the intensity of production sharing and is referred as the "state
of art" and an "appealing" measure of of vertical specialization by (Antras,
8In case there is no international production fragmentation pijni = 1 if n = i and 0
otherwise.
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2013, chap. 2). Gross trade ﬂow overestimates the actual content of trade,
i.e., value-added trade ﬂow if VAX ratio is less than one and vice versa.
This kind of overestimation or underestimation, as we argue, is the cause
of the missing "Linder Hypothes" in aggregate trade ﬂow. We plot the
VAX ratio for the export of Japan, Britain, China, and Mexico to the
U.S. in Figure 2.2. We may examine the year of 2005. Gross trade ﬂow
underestimates the export from Japan and Britain to the U.S and e.g.,
Japan's value-added export to the U.S. is underestimated by around 10%
using gross trade ﬂow . On the other hand, gross trade ﬂow overestimates
the value-added export from China or Mexico to the U.S. and e.g., Mexico's
value-added export to the U.S is overestimated by around 40% using gross
trade ﬂow. Given the ﬁxed import as the U.S., this evidence suggests that
gross trade ﬂow accounts more than the actual content of trade between
developed (i.e., high income per capita) and developing (i.e., low income
per capita) countries and accounts less than the actual content of trade
between developed countries. "Linder Hypothesis" is likely to be missing
in gross trade ﬂow and be recovered using the actual content of trade, i.e.,
value-added trade ﬂow.
2.4.1 Value-added trade ﬂow
As shown in Section 2.2.3, value-added trade ﬂow rather than gross trade
ﬂow should reﬂect the "Linder Term". Given the dominance of Equation
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2.19 used in the gravity literature, we replace ln GTji with ln V ATji while
maintaining the right-hand side structure of Equation 2.19. Firstly, we use
ln V ATji as the dependent variable and estimate
ln V ATji = %+ βLinderji + γXji + σi + σj + υji, (2.20)
where Xji is a set of bilateral control variables; σi and σj are respectively
the importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects; and ji is the error term. The result
of the estimation is shown in Table 2.6. The magnitude for βˆ is (much)
smaller in all columns in comparison with Table 2.5. The use of value
added trade (in log) as our dependent variable does not ﬁnd a negative βˆ
except in Columns (4) and (5) and does not recover "Linder Hypothesis"
straightly. However, the (much) smaller magnitude of βˆ suggests that value
added trade (in log), as we've shown in Section 2.2, is the correct trade ﬂow
from which "Linder Hypothesis" may resurface.9
2.4.2 VAX ratio
The larger the VAT ratio (
VATji
GTji
) is, the larger value added trade ﬂow is
relative to gross trade ﬂow. The VAT ratio measures the extent to which
gross export over (or under) measures the actual content of trade. We use
VATji
GTji
as the dependent variable and estimate
VATji
GTji
= %+ βLinderji + γXji + σi + σj + υji, (2.21)
9The estimated coeﬃcient of "Linder Term" in Column (6) of Table 2.6, for example,
has less than half the size of that in Column (6) of Table 2.5.
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where a negative estimate of βˆ would implies that VATji is smaller relative
to the GTji when country i and country j have larger income gap controlling
bilateral trade cost variables Xji and country ﬁxed eﬀect σi and σj and vice
versa.




years. The estimated coeﬃcient βˆ is negative in all columns ranging from
-0.01 to -0.04 and is signiﬁcant in Column (1) (2) and (6). The result
conﬁrms that value-added trade ﬂow is smaller relative to gross trade ﬂow
when the income per capita is more dissimilar between two counties and
suggests gross trade ﬂow is likely to over measure the actual trade between
North and South countries in the presence of "Triangle Trade" or more
generally international production fragmentation which is the cause of the
missing "Linder Hypothesis" as we suggest in this paper.
2.5 Conclusion
"Linder hypothesis" is missing for aggregate gross trade ﬂow as we conﬁrm
in this paper using the workhorse gravity model. We build a model which
suggests that value added trade ﬂow, i.e., the actual content of trade, in-
stead of gross trade ﬂow should be used to assess "Linder Hypothesis" in
the presence of international production fragmentation and ﬁnds an addi-
tive "Linder Term" only in the updated gravity model of value added trade
ﬂow. We ﬁnd empirical support of the model's main prediction using value
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added trade ﬂow or the VAX ratio. Our paper shows that international pro-
duction fragmentation may help understand puzzles in international trade,
e.g., the missing "Linder Hypothesis".
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Fig. 2.1 Trade ﬂows
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Tab. 2.1 WIOD Country List
Countries in WIOD Input-Output Table
North American (NA) Asia Pacific (AP) South America (SA)
AUT FRA NLD CAN AUS BRA
BEL GBR POL USA CHN
BGR GRC PRT MEX IDN
CYP HUN ROU IND
CZE IRL RUS JPN
DEU ITA SVK KOR
DNK LTU SVN TUR




Notes:  This table reports the 3-letter country codes published by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). In addition to the countries reported above, there is a "the rest of the world" region 
in the WIOD Input-Output Table.
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Tab. 2.2 TiVA Country List
South American (SA) Africa (AF)
AUT ISL ESP MLT CAN AUS SGP CHL ZAF
BEL IRL SWE MEX ISR HKG ARG
CZE ITA CHE USA JPN MYS BRA
DNK LUX GBR KOR PHL
EST NLD RUS NZL THA
FIN NOR ROU TUR VNM
FRA POL BGR CHN SAU
DEU PRT CYP TWN BRN
GRC SVK LVA IND KHM
HUN SVN LTU IDN
Countries in TiVA Input-Output Table
European Union (EU)
Notes:  This table reports the 3-letter country codes published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). In addition 
to the countries reported above, there is a "the rest of the world" region in the TiVA Input-Output Table.
North America (NA) Asia Pacific (AP)
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Tab. 2.3 WIOD Industry List
Industries in WIOD Input-Output Table
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel
Mining and Quarrying Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
Food, Beverages and Tobacco Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods
Textiles and Textile Products Hotels and Restaurants
Leather, Leather and Footwear Inland Transport
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork Water Transport
Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing Air Transport
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies
Chemicals and Chemical Products Post and Telecommunications
Rubber and Plastics Financial Intermediation
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Real Estate Activities
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities
Machinery, Nec Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security
Electrical and Optical Equipment Education
Transport Equipment Health and Social Work
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling Other Community, Social and Personal Services
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply Private
Construction
Notes:  The Industries are generally defined at ISIC rev.3 2-digit level while in some cases it is aggregation of several 2-digit 
industries.
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Tab. 2.4 TiVA Industry List
Industries in TiVA Input-Output Table
Code ISIC coverage Code ISIC coverage
AGR C01T05 OTM C36T37
MIN C10T14 EGW C40T41
FOD C15T16 CON C45
TEX C17T19 WRT C50T52
WOD C20 HTR C55
PAP C21T22 TRN C60T63
PET C23 PTL C64
CHM C24 FIN C65T67
RBP C25 REA C70
NMM C26 RMQ C71
MET C27 ITS C72
FBM C28 RDS C73
MEQ C29 BZS C74
ITQ C30 GOV C75
ELQ C31 EDU C80
CMQ C32 HTH C85
SCQ C33 OTS C90T93
MTR C34 PVH C95
TRQ C35
Notes: The Industries codes are taken from the table, 
generally defined at ISIC rev.3 2-digit level or their 
aggregation. CxxTyy means this industry covers ISIC industry 
xx to ISIC industry yy.
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Tab. 2.5 Gross export (in log) and standard gravity equation
65































China notiﬁed GATT (WTO's predecessor) in July 1986 that it would like
to resume its status as a GATT contracting party. It took 15 years before
it ﬁnally joined WTO in Dec 2001. The return to GATT was suspended
as China debated whether to continue its market reform between 1987
and 1992. After the southern tour of Deng Xiaoping in 1992, the drive of
market reform resumed and China oﬃcially applied to join the WTO in
1995 but failed. In the following years, China had negotiated with WTO
members bilaterally. Such negotiations could be tough and lengthy. The
agreement between China and the U.S., e.g., was reached after 25 rounds
of negotiations spanning four years.
China began to fulﬁll its responsibilities to reduce various trade and
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investment barriers as a WTO member country from early 2002. Tariﬀ
reduction is one pivotal aspect of China's WTO accession. China was re-
quired to complete much of tariﬀ reduction by 2004 according to the WTO
accession agreement and tariﬀ was reduced substantially after 2002 and
rather stabilized by 2007. Figure 3.1 presents China's (average) tariﬀ rates
for 16 tradable sectors in 2001 and 2007. There is widespread and substan-
tial tariﬀ reduction between 2001 and 2007 by China. To a lesser extent,
other WTO members reciprocally reduce the tariﬀ on Chinese exports.
Figure 3.2 presents the (average) tariﬀ on Chinese exports for 16 tradable
sectors in 2001 and 2007.
Figure 3.3 plots the timeline of China's application to WTO and the
subsequent trade liberalization after its accession to WTO. The debate
within China and its negotiations with existing WTO members imply both
China and existing WTO members delicately evaluate the eﬀects from
China's WTO accession. Indeed, one may question what the eﬀect on
China is and how much the global impact is from the WTO accession.
In this paper, we would like to address this question by quantifying the
trade and welfare eﬀects from China's WTO accession or more speciﬁcally
from the tariﬀ reduction after the WTO accession. We would document the
signiﬁcant and increasing presence of international production fragmenta-
tion (or trade in intermediate goods) in China's trade and then employ a
multi-sector Ricardian model embedded with comprehensive input-output
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structure to quantify the trade and welfare eﬀects from China's WTO ac-
cession given the presence of international production fragmentation. Inter-
national production fragmentation is a crucial nature of China's trade as we
present in Section 3.3 and China's participation in international production
fragmentation increases substantially after its WTO accession. In order to
quantify the eﬀect of trade liberalization of China the model should accom-
modate the role of international production fragmentation. Furthermore a
model with international production fragmentation could amplify the trade
eﬀect of tariﬀ reduction (Yi, 2003) and also the welfare eﬀect (Costinot and
Rodriguéz-Clare, 2014). While China's trade actually triples from 2001 to
2007 our quantitative assessment of the trade eﬀect from China's WTO
accession suggests China's trade grows by 42.9 % and a model without
comprehensive input-output structure would predicts even lower growth.
While trade in intermediate or international production sharing could be
extended to, e.g., Eaton and Kortum (2002) in some rather trivial way
we employ a model with a rich structure of sectoral linkages and sectoral
heterogeneity in production which better describes the real economy and
tends to capture the trade and welfare eﬀect to a fuller extend.
Our paper is related to and contributes to several strands of the litera-
ture.
Firstly, our paper contributes to international production fragmentation
literature. The recent work of Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Koopman
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et al. (2014) generalize the work of Hummels et al. (2001) to trace the
value added content of trade or simply value-added trade. Under the same
accounting framework Wang et al. (2013) decompose the sectoral gross out-
put into value-added contents from diﬀerent countries. These accounting
methodologies together with the development of world or regional input-
output tables spur a string of empirical papers that investigate diﬀerent
aspects of international production fragmentation. Timmer et al. (2013)
produce a new measure of competitiveness given increasing international
production fragmentation, Johnson (2014) documents ﬁve stylized facts of
value-added trade, Timmer et al. (2014) trace the value-added content of
capital and labor by slicing up the global value chains, Los et al. (2015)
measure how global the global value chains are, and Baldwin and Lopez-
Gonzalez (2015) review the revolution of global production and provide
several testable hypotheses. Our paper employs the methodologies of John-
son and Noguera (2012), Koopman et al. (2014), and Wang et al. (2013)
and ﬁnds international production fragmentation is a signiﬁcant nature of
China's trade and it increases after China's WTO accession.
Secondly, our paper is related to the research on the eﬀect of trade lib-
eralization, China's WTO accession in particular, on the Chinese economy.
Existing literature generally inspects diﬀerent microeconomic implications
of China's WTO accession. For instance, Lu and Yu (2015) ﬁnd the pro-
competitive eﬀect of China's WTO accession, Han et al. (2012) ﬁnd China's
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WTO accession increases wage inequality, and Brandt et al. (2012b) study
the eﬀect of China's WTO accession on ﬁrm performance and productivity
growth. Our paper is similar to these papers as we also study the eﬀect
of WTO accession but from a macroeconomic perspective our paper exam-
ines China's participation in the production of domestic and foreign gross
output and evaluates the trade and welfare eﬀects on China.
Thirdly, our paper is related to the studies on the eﬀect of trade with
China on foreign markets. Autor et al. (2013) analyze the eﬀect of Chinese
import competition on the U.S. labor market. Yi et al. (2015) investigate
the eﬀect of import from China on American politics. The work of Bloom et
al. (2015) examines the impact of import competition from China on tech-
nical change in the EU. Our paper quantiﬁes the global trade and welfare
impacts from China's trade liberalization caused by the WTO accession
from a macroeconomic perspective.
Lastly, our paper is related to papers that employ multi-sector Ricar-
dian models to quantify trade and welfare eﬀects from trade integration or
technical change. (Balistreri et al., 2011; Hsieh and Ossa, 2011; Shikher,
2011; Costinot et al., 2012; di Giovanni et al., 2014; Caliendo and Parro,
2015; Caliendo et al., 2015) Balistreri et al. (2011) and Caliendo et al.
(2015) build comprehensive input-output structure into the model of Melitz
(2003) and Chaney (2008) while di Giovanni et al. (2014) and Caliendo and
Parro (2015) extend the model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with similar
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input-output structure.1 We employ the Ricardian approach, i.e., Caliendo
and Parro (2015) in our quantitative assessment of the eﬀect from China's
WTO accession as it particularly models tariﬀ reduction and the trade
and welfare implications from it could be discussed from the more tradi-
tional perspectives, e.g., comparative advantage, terms of trade or volume
of trade.2 Our paper is diﬀerent from Caliendo and Parro (2015) as we
study one country's integration into global trade which is of our particular
interest while their work is about the creation of a regional free trade area
and we also highlight our model's connection to international production
fragmentation. The work of Hsieh and Ossa (2011) and di Giovanni et al.
(2014) are related to the Chinese context.3 They study global welfare im-
pacts of China's sector-level technical change while our paper studies the
domestic and global eﬀects from China's WTO accession.
Section 3.2 introduces the datasets we use in this paper including China's
import and export tariﬀs in 2001 and 2007. Section 3.3 documents China's
signiﬁcant and increasing participation in international production frag-
1di Giovanni et al. (2014) use less comprehensive input-output structure in the main
text and use the same input-output structure as Balistreri et al. (2011), Caliendo et al.
(2015) and Caliendo and Parro (2015) in robustness check. Balistreri et al. (2011) and
Caliendo and Parro (2015) have separated tariﬀ and iceberg trade cost while Caliendo
et al. (2015) discuss the modeling of tariﬀ even more extensively.
2In Caliendo et al. (2015) which takes the heterogeneous ﬁrm approach, tariﬀ reduc-
tion can have eﬀect on the extensive margin, i.e., the entry and exit of ﬁrms. It may be
interesting to see the eﬀect of the tariﬀ reduction after China's WTO accession on the
entry and exit of Chinese and foreign ﬁrms and we leave it for future research.
3di Giovanni et al. (2014) also examines welfare gains of trade integration. Unlike our
paper which evaluate the eﬀect of one speciﬁc episode of trade liberalization, China's
WTO accession, they evaluate the welfare gains from no trade with China to free trade
with China
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mentation. This evidence suggests that international production fragmen-
tation should be accounted to evaluate the eﬀects from China's WTO ac-
cession. Section 3.4 presents the multi-sector Ricardian model with com-
prehensive input-output structure. Section 3.5 describes our counterfactual
exercise and quantiﬁes trade and welfare eﬀects from China's WTO acces-
sion. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
We use mainly the data fromWorld-Input Output Database (WIOD) which
provides time-series of World Input-Output Tables for 40 countries (and the
rest of the world) and 35 sectors from 1995 to 2011. (Timmer et al., 2015)
The list of countries is presented in Table 3.1. The 40 countries (and the
rest of the world) are grouped into four regions.4 The list of sectors (16
tradable and 19 non-tradable sectors) and their corresponding ISIC rev. 3
industries are presented in Table 3.2.
The World Input-Output Tables is one of the major regional/global
input-output tables currently available (Johnson, 2014) and is used in a
number of recent studies. WIOD also provides Social Economic Accounts
(SEA) which record sectoral gross output, value added, and etc. across
countries. World Input-Output Table is used in our paper to examine
trade in intermediate (and ﬁnal) goods, calculate value-added trade, and
4Brazil and the rest of the world in WIOD are grouped into the rest of world region
together.
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to decompose gross output into domestic and foreign content. The bi-
lateral gross trade ﬂow, sectoral gross output, and value added in World
Input-Output Table in 2001 are used to quantifying the eﬀects of China's
Accession to WTO. 5
The ad-valorem tariﬀs for the years 2001 and 2007 are obtained from
the United Nations Statistical Division, Trade Analysis and Information
System (UNCTAD-TRAINS). The bilateral eﬀective applied tariﬀs are ob-
tained at ISIC rev. 3 2-digit industry. Eﬀective applied tariﬀ is the actual
tariﬀ applied. The most-favored-nation (MFN) tariﬀs at ISIC rev. 3 2-digit
industry for each country are also downloaded as well. When the bilateral
eﬀective applied tariﬀ was not available, we use the most-favored-nation
tariﬀ of the importing country. We match ISIC industries to WIOD sec-
tors according to the concordance in Table 3.2 and calculate the tariﬀ for
each WIOD sector as the average of tariﬀs of ISIC industries that matched
to it. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 present the average eﬀective applied tariﬀ rates for
China's import and export for 16 tradable sectors in 2001 and 2007. After
China joined WTO in Dec 2001, China experienced signiﬁcant reduction of
import and export tariﬀ and the tariﬀ rate in 2007 was much smaller than
in 2001 for most sectors.
The sectoral trade elasticities of ISIC rev. 3 2-digit industries are taken
5Costinot and Rodriguéz-Clare (2014) e.g., calculate welfare gains from trade for
diﬀerent models, including the multi-sector Ricardian model employed in this paper,
using mostly data from WIOD. The only other data they use is trade elasticities from
Caliendo and Parro (2015). Our paper thus uses mainly data from WIOD as well.
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from Caliendo and Parro (2015) and we calculate the trade elasticities
for 16 tradable sectors as the average of their matched ISIC rev.3 2-digit
industries. See Table 3.3
3.3 China's signiﬁcant and increasing partic-
ipation in international production frag-
mentation
In this Section, we document China's signiﬁcant and increasing partici-
pation in international production fragmentation. Speciﬁcally, we study
China's trade in intermediate (and ﬁnal) goods and its role in international
production sharing (Wang et al., 2013) in value added terms in 2001 and
2007.
To begin with, we investigate China's (gross) trade in intermediate and
ﬁnal goods. There is some classiﬁcation of goods into intermediate and ﬁnal
goods. However the classiﬁcation is rather arbitrary and we follow the use
of trade ﬂow indicated in WIOD tables instead. Figure 3.4 presents China's
export of intermediate and ﬁnal goods across sectors. China exports more
ﬁnal goods than intermediate goods. However, trade in intermediate goods
should not be uncounted and is signiﬁcant for several sectors. For manu-
facturing sectors, e.g., Paper, Chemicals and Electrical, the share of inter-
mediate goods is close or even higher than 50 % and is higher in 2007 than
in 2001.
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The importance of trade in intermediate goods is even more evident if
we have a look at China's import. Figure 3.5 shows the import value of
intermediate goods and ﬁnal goods across sectors in 2001 and 2007. Trade
in intermediate goods takes a dominant share in China's import across
sectors. While the large share of intermediate goods may be considered
as normal for, e.g., Agriculture and Mining the trade in intermediate is
particularly prevalent in many manufacturing sectors as well. The share of
intermediate goods is larger in 2007 than in 2001 across sectors.
Furthermore, we study China's role international production sharing in
value added terms. Wang et al. (2013) provide a methodology to decompose
the sectoral gross output into value-added content from diﬀerent countries.
This methodology follows the same inﬁnite Leontief inverse accounting used
in Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Koopman et al. (2014). We deﬁne the
production of gross output in one sector in one country as one global value
chain. In total we have 33 global value chains of Chinese sectoral gross
output and 1383 foreign sectoral gross output.6
Firstly, we examine the use of foreign value added content in Chinese
gross output. In Figure 3.6 we plot the foreign share of content in aggre-
gate Chinese gross output from 1995 to 2011. The foreign share of content
6The WIOD Database does not have information for several value chains. In fact,
information is not available for "Repair of Motor Vehicles and Mortobikes; Retail Sale of
Fuel" and "Private Household with Employed Persons" in China and we have 33 value
chains of Chinese gross output. Similarly, information is not available for 17 foreign
value chains and there are foreign 1383 value chains.
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is around 16.5 % in 2001 and increases to 24.7 % in 2007. In Figure 3.7
we plot a similar graph for aggregate Chinese manufacturing gross out-
put. The foreign share of content for manufacturing is around 18.0 % in
2001 and increases to 27.0 % in 2007. It is noteworthy that the increase
of foreign share of content accelerates from 2002 right after China's WTO
accession. This share is peaked in 2005 and stabilized during 2004-2007.7
Such increase of foreign share of content is extraordinary as Chinese econ-
omy, averaging double-digit growth rate in terms of gross domestic product,
doubles its share in world economy during this period. In Figure 3.8 we plot
the foreign share of content for each value chain of Chinese gross output in
2001 and 2007. Almost all value chains, manufacturing or not, uses more
foreign value-added content in 2007. The above evidence suggests that at
aggregate or industry level it's pellucid that Chinese economy uses more
foreign value-added content (thus intermediate goods) in its production of
gross output after the's WTO accession.
Secondly, we examine the use of Chinese value added content in foreign
gross output. We plot Chinese share of content in aggregate foreign gross
output from 1995 and 2011 in Figure 3.9. The share is less than 1 % across
all regions in 1995 and increases over time. The share doubles in EU, NA,
and ROW and triples in AP from 2001 to 2007. For aggregate foreign
7The foreign share of content declines sharply after the global ﬁnancial crisis which is
consistent with the hypothesis that international vertical supply disintegrates. (Eichen-
green, 2009; Yi, 2009)
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manufacturing gross output, similar pattern is observed as in Figure 3.10.
While China's spectacular economic growth may explain part of its increas-
ing participation in the production of foreign gross output on aggregate we
also ﬁnd substantial variation of change of Chinese share of content across
foreign sectors and the change is particularly large for several global value
chains. In Figure 3.11 we plot Chinese share of content in 2001 and 2007
for all global value chains of foreign gross output. Most global value chains
of foreign gross output use more Chinese value-added content while many
of them more than double its use of Chinese value-added content. Again
Chinese value-added content participates more actively in the production
of foreign gross output on aggregate and the increase of its participation
are particularly obvious for several foreign sectors in 2007.
The above evidence from trade in intermediate goods and international
production sharing suggests that China has a signiﬁcant role in interna-
tional production fragmentation which is further increased after its WTO
accession and international production fragmentation should be accounted
when quantifying the trade and welfare eﬀect from China's WTO accession.
3.4 Model
Section 3.3 documents China's increasing participation in international pro-
duction fragmentation. In order to capture this phenomenon and its im-
plications, we employ a multi-country multi-sector Ricardian model with
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comprehensive input-output structure. There are N counties and J sectors.
The sectors are either tradable or non-tradable and there is only one factor
of production, labor. Labor is mobile across sectors and not mobile across
countries. All markets are perfectively competitive.
3.4.1 Intermediate goods
Each sector j has a continuum of intermediate goods ωj. The production
technology and the eﬃciency of production diﬀer across countries. The
eﬃciency of production for any intermediate good ωj in country n is z
j
n














j) is labor input; mk,jn (ω
j) is the composite intermediate goods
from sector k used for the production of intermediate goods ωj; γjn is the
share of value added; and γk,jn > 0 is the share of input from sector k used in







Both γjn and γ
k,j
n vary across countries and sectors. This feature permits
sectoral heterogeneity, ﬂexible sectoral linkages, and production diﬀerences
across countries which together with international trade better capture the
reality of international production fragmentation and thus quantify the
eﬀects from trade liberalization. di Giovanni et al. (2014) uses less com-
prehensive input-output structure in which γjn and γ
k,j
n do not vary across
countries in their baseline model while countries' production technology of
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the same sector generally diﬀers as in, e.g., World Input-Output Tables.
Further, such comprehensive input-output structure is consistent with the
construction of world/regional input-output tables and also the methodol-
ogy of Johnson and Noguera (2012), Koopman et al. (2014), and Wang et
al. (2013) which is applied in Section 3.3.
The constant returns to scale for the production technology and per-















where P kn is the price of composite intermediate good of sector k in country






−γjn is a constant.
We assume the eﬃciency of producing intermediate good ωj of sector j
in country n is drawn from the Fréchet distribution with a shape parame-
ter θj that varies by sector and a location parameter λjn ≥ 0 that varies by
country and sector. The shape parameter governs the dispersion of produc-
tivity across intermediate good ωj in sector j and the location parameter
λjn measures the average productivity of sector j in country n. We also as-
sume that the distribution of productivities are independent across goods,
sectors and countries, and that 1 + θj > σj.
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3.4.2 Composite intermediate goods
Composite intermediate goods from sector j are consumed as Cnj in the
ﬁnal goods consumption and used as intermediate input for the production




Producers of composite intermediate goods in country n and sector j
chase intermediate good ωj from the lowest cost suppliers across countries.








where ρjni is the total trade cost to ship one unit of sector j's goods from









where σj > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods







Qjn is the demand for intermediate












j) is the lowest price of intermediate good ω supplied to
country n in Equation (3.3)
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3.4.3 Consumers
In any country n, there are Ln representative consumers who maximize the
utility by consuming ﬁnal good Cjn from all sectors. The preference of the








j=1 αn = 1. Since αn varies across countries it allows consumption
pattern diﬀer across countries.
The consumers has two sources of income. They supply labor Ln at a
wage wn and receive the tariﬀ revenues and transfers from the rest of the
world. We denote their income In.
3.4.4 International trade costs
There are two types of trade costs: ad-valorem ﬂat-rate tariﬀs and iceberg
trade costs. The ad-valorem ﬂat-rate tariﬀ τ jni applicable over unit prices
is imposed on sector j's goods imported by country n from country i. The
iceberg costs are deﬁned in terms of physical goods such that djni ≥ 1 units
of sector j's goods from country i must be shipped for one unit to arrive






in which τ˜ jni = (1 + τ
j
ni).
8The usual assumptions of iceberg trade costs, dii = 1 and dnodoi > dni, hold
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We impose ρjni = ∞ for non-tradable sectors and for non-tradable sec-










Under the assumptions of productivity distribution and trade costs, the
price of the composite intermediate good of sector j in country n












where Aj is a constant. This price index applies to the non-tradable sectors
and since ρjni =∞ we have P jn = Aj(λjn)−1/θjcjn.









3.4.6 Expenditure and trade balance




n the total expenditure on sector j goods in coun-
try n andXjni is the expenditure in country n of sector j goods from country
i. Country n's share of expenditure on sector j's goods from country i is
given by pi = Xjn/X
j
n. The expenditure share as a function of trade costs,

















The total expenditure on sector j's goods in country n is the sum of
the expenditure on composite intermediate goods by consumers and ﬁrms









1 + τ kin
+ αjnIn, (3.11)
where In = Rn + Dn + wnLn is the sum of tariﬀ revenue
9, trade deﬁcit10,
and labor income.















1 + τ jin
(3.12)





and tariﬀ structure τ , will pin down equilibrium wages w ∈ RN++ and prices
{P jn}J,Nj=1,n=1.
3.5 Quantifying Trade andWelfare Eﬀects from
China's WTO Accession
In this section, we employ the model presented in Section 3.4 to measure
trade and welfare eﬀects from the change in tariﬀ structure caused by
China's WTO accession. Our base year is 2001 as China joins WTO in

















−∑Ni=1Xji pijin1+τjin . National deﬁcits are




n and the summation of trade deﬁcits




of 40 countries (and the rest of world) and 35 sectors as explained in Section
3.2. The gross output and value-added across countries come from Social
Economic Accounts. The bilateral trade ﬂow comes from World Input-
Output Table which also provides input-output coeﬃcients γk,jn .
Section 3.4 presents a general equilibrium model but our counterfac-
tual exercise is in terms of relative changes without relying on total factor
productivity λjn or transport costs dni which can only be estimated. This
methodology is used and popularized by Dekle et al. (2007). The details
of the equilibrium in relative changes is in Appendix A. In addition, the
welfare and real wage decomposition of the model is presented in Appendix
B.
In our counterfactual exercise we allow China's eﬀective applied tariﬀ
rates to change from their levels in 2001 to their levels in 2007, ﬁx the rest
of tariﬀ rates at its 2001 level, and solve the changes in wages w ∈ RN++
and prices {P jn}J,Nj=1,n=1. This exercise evaluates the eﬀects from the change
in China's tariﬀ structure caused by the WTO accession conditional on no
changes of tariﬀ in any other bilateral trade relationships.
The counterfactual changes to tariﬀ rates is not to adjust the countries'
aggregate trade deﬁcits in Equation (3.12) which are exogenous to the
theoretical model. We deal with this in two ways suggested by Caliendo and
Parro (2015). Firstly, we calibrate the model with aggregate deﬁcits in 2001
and calculate the counterfactual changes keeping the countries' aggregate
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trade deﬁcits as a constant share of world GDP. Secondly, we calibrate our
model to zero aggregate trade deﬁcits Dn = 0 and then the implied no-
deﬁcit world is used as our base year. The results and implications of our
counterfactual exercise using these two methods are similar. We presents
counterfactual calculations using no-deﬁcit world as our base year.
3.5.1 Domestic Trade andWelfare Eﬀects from China's
WTO Accession
We evaluate the trade and welfare eﬀects from China's WTO accession on
China itself. The ﬁrst row of Table 3.4 presents the welfare eﬀects from the
WTO accession. China's welfare increases by 1.00%.11 The total welfare
eﬀect consists of 0.39 % welfare loss due to terms of trade eﬀects and 1.39
% welfare gain due to volume of trade eﬀects. The real wage increase is
1.03%.
When only import tariﬀ reduction is considered the welfare increases
by 0.66 % as in the second row of Table 3.4. The welfare gain is 0.18%
as in the third row considering only export tariﬀ reduction. Much of the
welfare gain is from import tariﬀ reduction and this is consistent with the
observation that there is much larger import tariﬀ reduction than export
tariﬀ reduction. When the change of tariﬀ structure is accounted fully the
welfare gain is around 0.20% larger than the sum of welfare gain under
only import tariﬀ reduction and only export tariﬀ reduction. Given the
11For comparison, the welfare gain of Mexico from NAFTA is 1.68%. We consider 1%
as a not small welfare gain for China, a much larger economy.
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comprehensive input output structure of this model the beneﬁt of low in-
termediate input costs after import tariﬀ reduction should be larger if the
foreign markets are also more open to Chinese output. Thus the eﬀect of
both import and export tariﬀ reduction should be larger than the eﬀect
of only import tariﬀ reduction, the eﬀect of export tariﬀ reduction, or the
sum of these two eﬀects, consistent with observation in Table 3.4.
Table 3.5 presents sectoral contribution the welfare eﬀect. There is
considerable variation in the sectoral contribution to welfare eﬀect and still
a handful sectors are representative to explain the aggregate changes. 62
% of China's deterioration of terms of trade is accounted by the top 3
contributors alone, Textile, Basic Metals, and Electrical. For volume of
trade eﬀect, Agriculture alone account almost half of it and together with
Electrical and Transport contribute to 72 % of the gain in volume of trade
eﬀect. The magnitude of the reduction in tariﬀ, the share of materials used
in production, the importance of sectoral linkages are the main explanation
to the large contribution of these sectors.
Textile, Basic Metals, and Electrical sectors experience substantial im-
port tariﬀ reduction of 8%, 4%, and 8%. The share of intermediate goods
from its own sector used in production are the highest, 54% for Textile,
48% for Basic Metals, and 48% for Electrical. The reduction of import
tariﬀ on intermediate goods used in production will lower the production
cost and thus the price. This leads to the deterioration of terms of the
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trade.
The volume of trade eﬀect from Agriculture can be explained by the
substantial import tariﬀ reduction and the sectoral linkage between Agri-
culture and other sectors. The import tariﬀ reduction for Agriculture is
8%. Meanwhile 85% of imports in Agriculture is used as intermediate
goods, particularly for manufacturing sectors e.g., Food and Chemicals.
The growth of production and export in such manufacturing sectors would
lead to more import of Agriculture.
In our counterfactual exercise China's trade grows by 42.9% while China's
actual trade triples between 2001 and 2007. Indeed, we only account for
the eﬀect of tariﬀ reduction while there is also substantial reduction in non-
tariﬀ barrier, signiﬁcant technical change, large inﬂow of FDI, and etc. that
may contribute to China's trade growth. Amiti and Freund (2010), e.g.,
argue that FDI and trade of foreign invested ﬁrms are more responsible for
the spectacular growth of China's trade.
Table 3.6 presents the import share and growth by sector before and
after China's WTO accession. Agriculture, Paper and Textile receives the
largest import growth. The import tariﬀ reduction is 8%, 8%, and 7% for
these three sectors and is the ﬁrst factor behind the their import growth.
The extraordinary import growth of Agriculture and Paper is further due to
their use as intermediate goods in other sectors. Paper, similar to Textile,
has a high share of intermediate goods from its own sector of 40%. The
90
Herﬁndalh Index drops from 0.047 to 0.033 and China's import is less
concentrated. This is, e.g., due to the more uniform import tariﬀ across
sectors after China's WTO accession.
Table 3.7 presents the export share and growth by sector before and af-
ter China's WTO accession. Several sectors experiences substantial export
growth. The export growth in these sectors generally may be explained as
the result of the reduction of import tariﬀ of intermediate input or export
tariﬀ. The export growth of Petroleum, e.g., may be due to export tariﬀ
reduction and import tariﬀ reduction of Mining which accounts for two
thirds of its intermediate input. The export growth of Electrical is mostly
driven by the import tariﬀ reduction of Electrical (itself) which accounts
for almost half of its intermediate input. The Herﬁndalh Index does not
change much for China's export.
3.5.2 Global Trade and Welfare Eﬀects from China's
WTO Accession
The losses and gains from trade with China have been a economic and
political issue/debate in many counties for many years. While developed
countries consume even cheaper manufacturing products imported from
China they ﬁnd blue-collars jobs no longer exist. China which face less
export barriers and cheaper imported intermediate good after the WTO
accession simply becomes a stronger competitor for other developing coun-
tries whose comparative advantages overlap with those of China.
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We quantify the global trade and welfare eﬀect from China's WTO
accession which contributes to China's rise to a trade and economic super-
power today.
Table 3.9 and 3.8 present the percentage change of import and export
of 40 countries. All countries's trade with China grows and generally the
growth of trade with China is at the sacriﬁce of other trade relationships.
Such trade diversion eﬀect is expected as we consider the tariﬀ reduction
between China and other WTO partners and ﬁx the bilateral tariﬀ rates
between other countries in our counterfactual exercise. In Table 3.10 we
present the change of trade between regions. Similarly, trade with China
grows and there is less intra-regional trade (in diagonal entries) and less
inter-regional trade in (in oﬀ diagonal entries). It again suggests that trade
is diverted to China.
Lastly Table 3.11 presents the global welfare eﬀects from China's WTO
accession. The welfare eﬀect is small across countries. Greece is the only
country that experiences a loss in welfare but the size of the eﬀect, -0.02%,
is quite small. Indonesia and South Korea beneﬁt from China's WTO
accession the most. Welfare increases by 0.24% for Indonesia's and 0.17%
for South Korea.
The terms of trade eﬀect is negative for countries that compete mostly
with Chinese manufacturing exports. For example, it is -0.14% for Indone-
sia, -0.07% for Mexico, -0.02% for Taiwan. For developed countries, the
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terms of trade eﬀect is small and generally positive as Chinese manufac-
turing products get cheaper while they compete with China less directly.
The volume of trade eﬀect is generally positive and small. The cheaper
import from China generates positive volume of trade eﬀect while the loss of
trade with other countries due to trade diversion produce negative volume
of trade eﬀect. The overall eﬀect is a matter of the magnitude of the two
forces. Indonesia, Taiwan, and Korea experience the largest gain in volume
of trade eﬀect of 0.38%, 0.14% and 0.13%. Trade with China is signiﬁcant
for these countries and notably their production is more integrated with
China in international production fragmentation.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we document China's signiﬁcant and increasing role in in-
ternational production fragmentaion and quantify the trade and welfare
eﬀects from China's accession to WTO. Speciﬁcally, we quantify trade and
welfare eﬀects due to tariﬀ reduction for China's imports and exports be-
tween 2001 and 2007. China's trade grows by 42.9 % and welfare increases
by 1 %. There is trade diversion to China and the global welfare eﬀect is
generally positive and small ranging from -0.2 % to 0.24 %. The terms of
trade worsens for countries that compete more directly with China and the
volume of trade is larger for countries that are more integrated with China
in international production fragmentation.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Tab. 3.1 The list of WIOD countries
Country ISO code Region Country ISO code Region
AUS Asia Pacific IRL Europe
AUT Europe ITA Europe
BEL Europe JPN Asia Pacific
BGR Europe KOR Asia Pacific
BRA Rest of World LTU Europe
CAN North America LUX Europe
CHN Asia Pacific LVA Europe
CYP Europe MEX North America
CZE Europe MLT Europe
DEU Europe NLD Europe
DNK Europe POL Europe
ESP Europe PRT Europe
EST Europe ROU Europe
FIN Europe RUS Europe
FRA Europe SVK Europe
GBR Europe SVN Europe
GRC Europe SWE Europe
HUN Europe TUR Asia Pacific
IDN Asia Pacific TWN Asia Pacific
IND Asia Pacific USA North America
Note:  There is a "Rest of World" region in the WIOD Input-Output Table
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Tab. 3.2 The list of WIOD sectors
Sector Code WIOD sectors Corresponding ISIC rev.3 
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing AtB
2 Mining and Quarrying C
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15t16
4 Textiles and Textile Products 17t18
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 21t22
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 24
10 Rubber and Plastics 25
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27t28
13 Machinery, Nec 29
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 30t33
15 Transport Equipment 34t35
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36t37
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E
18 Construction F
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 50
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 51
21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 52
22 Hotels and Restaurants H
23 Inland Transport 60
24 Water Transport 61
25 Air Transport 62
26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 63
27 Post and Telecommunications 64
28 Financial Intermediation J
29 Real Estate Activities 70
30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 71t74
31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security L
32 Education M
33 Health and Social Work N
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services O
35 Private Households with Employed Persons P
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Fig. 3.3 Timeline of China's application to WTO and subsequent trade liberal-
ization
































































































































20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007 20012007













































Intermediate goods Final goods
100



















































































































































































Intermediate goods Final goods
101



















1995 2000 2005 2010
year
102



















1995 2000 2005 2010
year
103

























0 10 20 30 40
foreign share of content in 2001 (%)
manufacturing non-manufacturing
104

















































Fig. 3.10 foreign share of content in China's manufacturing gross output
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Tab. 3.4 Welfare eﬀects on China from China's WTO accession
Total Terms of Trade Volumn of trade Real Wage
Both import and export tariff reduction 1.00% -0.39% 1.38% 1.03%
Only import tariff reduction 0.66% -0.52% 1.18% 0.82%
Only export tariff reduction 0.18% 0.09% 0.09% 0.11%
Welfare
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Basic metals 6.29% 0.91%





Tab. 3.6 Import share and growth by sector before and after China's WTO
accession
Sector Before After Growth
Agriculture 2.87% 10.13% 404.49%
Mining 7.12% 5.53% 11.04%
Food 1.93% 2.14% 58.10%
Textile 5.63% 6.90% 75.14%
Leather 1.35% 1.10% 16.69%
Wood 0.73% 0.88% 72.34%
Paper 2.69% 3.88% 105.90%
Petroleum 2.79% 2.14% 9.51%
Chemicals 13.05% 10.30% 12.84%
Rubber 1.48% 1.17% 12.48%
Non-Metallic 0.89% 0.64% 2.69%
Basic metals 9.50% 7.16% 7.71%
Machinery nec 11.47% 9.01% 12.19%
Electrical 32.70% 32.72% 42.98%
Transport 4.75% 5.32% 60.09%
Nec 1.06% 1.00% 34.44%




Tab. 3.7 Export share and growth by sector before and after China's WTO
accession
Sector Before After Growth
Agriculture 1.94% 1.71% 26.32%
Mining 2.93% 3.03% 47.70%
Food 4.09% 3.27% 14.28%
Textile 19.30% 16.80% 24.67%
Leather 4.82% 4.15% 23.04%
Wood 0.86% 0.78% 29.61%
Paper 0.92% 1.37% 113.12%
Petroleum 1.40% 12.10% 1130.13%
Chemicals 5.69% 4.52% 13.59%
Rubber 4.86% 3.52% 3.57%
Non-Metallic 2.30% 1.70% 5.60%
Basic metals 7.64% 6.46% 20.76%
Machinery nec 5.32% 3.93% 5.60%
Electrical 30.20% 30% 41.93%
Transport 2.67% 2.67% 42.96%
Nec 5.09% 3.99% 12.04%
Herfindalh Index of 
Export Concentration 0.127 0.124
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Tab. 3.8 Global import eﬀects from China's WTO accession
CHN EU AP NAFTA ROW
AUS 31.26% -1.35% -0.81% -1.50% -1.58%
AUT 8.66% 0.01% 0.18% 0.13% -0.13%
BEL 12.92% -0.09% 0.67% -0.30% -0.32%
BGR 61.07% -0.58% -0.24% -1.30% -1.26%
BRA 69.74% 0.72% 2.73% 1.37% 0.63%
CAN 30.75% -0.44% -0.63% -0.34% -0.88%
CYP 30.94% -0.45% -0.32% -0.56% -0.65%
CZE 25.02% -0.25% -0.43% -0.99% -0.44%
DEU 16.95% 0.05% -0.02% -0.05% -0.47%
DNK 7.59% -0.01% 0.35% 0.47% -0.56%
ESP 7.82% -0.08% 0.69% -0.10% -0.58%
EST 6.36% -0.07% -0.05% -0.38% -0.05%
FIN 17.80% 0.66% 1.03% 0.62% -0.17%
FRA 12.50% 0.16% 0.52% 0.09% -0.27%
GBR 8.91% -0.11% 0.23% -0.11% -0.24%
GRC 5.67% -0.74% -0.24% -1.18% -2.55%
HUN 16.10% -0.36% -0.70% -0.46% -0.57%
IDN 287.41% -7.40% -11.38% -16.54% -13.11%
IND 135.43% -2.22% -1.58% -2.43% -4.25%
IRL 17.67% 0.15% -0.38% 0.13% 0.16%
ITA 8.90% -0.06% 0.57% -0.12% -0.48%
JPN 23.71% -0.49% 0.58% -0.16% -0.80%
KOR 97.15% -0.44% -0.70% -2.94% -3.31%
LTU 12.53% -0.09% 0.24% 1.12% -2.03%
LUX 3.79% 0.11% -0.22% 0.26% 0.06%
LVA 7.17% -0.01% 0.40% -0.04% -0.06%
MEX 377.46% -1.94% -2.98% -4.04% -2.88%
MLT 6.81% 0.39% 0.48% 0.59% 0.68%
NLD 9.50% -0.08% 0.37% -0.29% -0.47%
POL 121.78% -0.99% -1.05% -1.62% -1.51%
PRT 6.12% -0.13% 0.38% 0.20% -0.71%
ROU 133.98% -0.28% -0.45% -0.96% -1.61%
RUS 58.29% -0.79% -0.58% -3.05% -0.89%
SVK 12.68% -0.09% -0.10% -0.20% -0.48%
SVN 102.42% -0.54% -0.49% -2.75% -0.90%
SWE 20.68% 0.10% 0.42% -0.02% -0.15%
TUR 53.02% -0.46% -0.07% -1.57% -1.12%
TWN 50.00% 1.50% 1.71% 3.55% -0.03%
USA 22.16% -0.58% -0.53% 0.92% -1.00%
ROW 66.56% -1.14% -0.76% -1.44% -2.03%
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Tab. 3.9 Global export eﬀects from China's WTO accession
CHN EU AP NAFTA ROW
AUS 17.96% 0.28% -1.12% 0.10% -0.25%
AUT 28.55% -0.12% -0.96% -0.43% -0.59%
BEL 23.34% -0.05% -1.22% -0.32% -1.39%
BGR 82.92% 1.79% 0.91% 0.84% -3.13%
BRA 167.07% -1.69% -2.60% -3.10% -2.03%
CAN 38.66% -0.19% -1.18% -0.28% -0.67%
CYP 229.53% -0.64% -7.96% 1.88% -0.64%
CZE 56.52% 0.09% -0.72% -0.50% -0.46%
DEU 29.09% -0.20% -0.53% -0.55% -0.81%
DNK 12.76% -0.09% -0.14% -0.49% -0.08%
ESP 26.58% 0.20% -0.89% -1.12% -1.38%
EST 81.73% 0.34% -1.43% -0.48% 0.22%
FIN 48.20% -0.92% -1.62% -1.01% -1.28%
FRA 42.51% -0.19% -0.82% -0.65% -1.15%
GBR 27.67% -0.16% -1.26% -0.54% -0.99%
GRC 22.77% 2.65% 1.32% 1.37% -4.01%
HUN 35.67% 0.21% -0.36% -0.62% -1.42%
IDN 26.50% 7.32% 7.37% 5.78% 5.22%
IND 54.21% 1.67% 1.00% 0.96% 1.80%
IRL 62.53% -0.29% -0.48% -0.44% -0.95%
ITA 23.41% -0.02% -1.27% -1.33% -0.89%
JPN 28.38% -0.31% -0.88% -0.78% -0.89%
KOR 45.20% 0.28% -2.61% -0.47% -0.50%
LTU 54.90% 0.56% -2.24% 0.17% -4.62%
LUX 46.28% -0.19% -2.87% -0.42% 0.22%
LVA 47.95% -0.03% 0.28% -0.01% -0.29%
MEX 50.66% 5.70% 4.49% 2.64% 3.11%
MLT 53.87% -0.72% -1.54% -2.69% -2.09%
NLD 22.02% -0.15% -0.34% -0.19% -0.89%
POL 63.09% 1.14% 0.32% 0.09% 0.34%
PRT 11.82% 0.12% -1.17% -1.79% -1.33%
ROU 90.49% 0.71% 0.50% -0.52% -3.95%
RUS 12.68% 0.50% 0.10% 0.18% 0.07%
SVK 19.28% 0.09% -0.23% -1.61% -0.41%
SVN 12.57% 0.39% -0.70% -0.46% 0.10%
SWE 35.26% -0.22% -1.18% -0.73% -0.75%
TUR 32.26% 0.22% -1.56% -0.20% -0.41%
TWN 32.78% -2.57% -3.74% -3.31% -4.07%
USA 75.76% -0.42% -0.83% -1.90% -1.48%
ROW 49.65% -0.42% -2.27% -0.94% 0.63%
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Tab. 3.10 Regional trade eﬀects from China's WTO accession
China EU AP NA RoW
China's imports - 30.12% 33.51% 70.02% 53.28%
EU's imports 16.81% -0.04% 0.20% -0.21% -0.49%
AP's imports 54.82% -0.79% -0.70% -0.77% -2.28%
NA's imports 36.99% -0.65% -0.69% -0.39% -1.09%
RoW's imports 66.65% -1.06% -0.64% -1.22% -0.92%
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Tab. 3.11 Global welfare eﬀects from China's WTO accession
Country Welfare TOT VOT Country Welfare TOT VOT
AUS 0.05% 0.02% 0.03% ITA 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%
AUT 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% JPN 0.03% 0.02% 0.01%
BEL 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% KOR 0.17% 0.04% 0.13%
BGR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% LTU 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
BRA 0.05% 0.03% 0.02% LUX 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CAN 0.04% 0.02% 0.01% LVA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CYP 0.03% 0.01% 0.02% MEX 0.01% -0.07% 0.09%
CZE 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% MLT 0.02% 0.01% 0.00%
DEU 0.03% 0.03% 0.00% NLD 0.02% 0.02% 0.00%
DNK 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% POL 0.12% -0.02% 0.14%
ESP 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% PRT 0.17% 0.04% 0.13%
EST 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% ROU 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FIN 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% RUS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FRA 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% SVK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
GBR 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% SVN 0.01% -0.07% 0.09%
GRC -0.02% -0.02% 0.00% SWE 0.02% 0.01% 0.00%
HUN 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% TUR 0.02% 0.02% 0.00%
IDN 0.24% -0.14% 0.38% TWN 0.12% -0.02% 0.14%
IND 0.00% -0.02% 0.02% USA 0.02% 0.02% 0.00%
IRL 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% ROW 0.12% -0.02% 0.14%
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Equilibrium in relative changes
The variable with a hap, xˆ = x
′
x
, represents the relative change of the
variable and x and xˆ are respectively the variable in initial equilibrium and
counterfactual.

































































































The total factor productivity λjn or transport cost ρ
j
ni in the equilibrium
in levels does not show up in the equilibrium of relative changes. To cal-
culate the relative changes, we only need ﬁrstly the sectoral dispersion of
productivity from Caliendo and Parro (2015); secondly, the share of value-
added in production, data on bilateral trade shares, value added, the share
of intermediate consumption, and the share of each sector in ﬁnal demand
all from WIOD; lastly, the two sets of tariﬀ structures from WITS.
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Appendix B
Welfare and real wage
decomposition



























where the ﬁrst item measure the volume of trade eﬀect and the second
term is the terms of trade eﬀect from tariﬀ changes.
From the above equation bilateral and sectoral measure of volume of
trade and terms of trade are deﬁned accordingly.































where the ﬁrst term captures the importance of sectoral linkages, the second
term is due to the role of intermediate goods, and the last term is the eﬀect
of trade in ﬁnal goods.
Caliendo and Parro (2015) present more details of welfare and real wage
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decomposition.
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